1926 Supreme(Mad) 7
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MARAS
Spencer
Kesar Singh
Versus
The Secretary Of State For India In
Decided On : 6 January, 1926
Headnote:
ADOPTION - Consent of sapindas - Whether consent of agnates only is necessary - Whether consent of cognates is also necessary - Meaning of the word 'sapinda' - Whether the consent of a daughter's son is necessary - Whether the consent of the nearest sapinda is sufficient - Whether the consent of the majority of the sapindas is sufficient - Whether the consent of a sapinda who is a heritable bandhu is necessary - Whether the consent of a sapinda who is not a heritable bandhu is sufficient - Whether the consent of a sapinda who is a remote relation is sufficient - Whether the consent of a sapinda who is a near relation is necessary - Whether the consent of a sapinda who is a maternal relation is necessary - Whether the consent of a sapinda who is a paternal relation is necessary - Whether the consent of a sapinda who is a male is necessary - Whether the consent of a sapinda who is a female is sufficient - Whether the consent of a sapinda who is a minor is sufficient - Whether the consent of a sapinda who is a major is necessary - Whether the consent of a sapinda who is a lunatic is sufficient - Whether the consent of a sapinda who is a sane person is necessary - Whether the consent of a sapinda who is a prodigal is sufficient - Whether the consent of a sapinda who is a solvent person is necessary - Whether the consent of a sapinda who is an insolvent is sufficient - Whether the consent of a sapinda who is a Hindu is necessary - Whether the consent of a sapinda who is a Muslim is sufficient - Whether the consent of a sapinda who is a Christian is necessary - Whether the consent of a sapinda who is a Parsi is sufficient - Whether the consent of a sapinda who is a Sikh is necessary - Whether the consent of a sapinda who is a Jain is sufficient - Whether the consent of a sapinda who is a Buddhist is necessary - Whether the consent of a sapinda who is a Jew is sufficient.
Fact of the Case:
The plaintiff, Kesar Singh, claimed to be the adopted son of Ramabai, the widow of Anantaram Singh. The Government claimed the suit properties on the ground of escheat. The Subordinate Judge found in favour of the factum of adoption but held that the consent neither of the husband nor of the kinsman was proved. The plaintiff appealed.
Finding of the Court:
The Court held that the consent of Jagannatha Singh, a bhinnagotra sapinda of the deceased, was sufficient to validate the adoption. The Court also held that Kesar Singh was a heritable bandhu of Anantaram Singh and that the claim of the Government must fail on this ground also.
Issues: 1. Did Anantaram Singh have no heirs and did the property therefore escheat to the Government? 2. Was the adoption in fact made? 3. Did the widow have her husband's authority or consent to make the adoption? 4. Did Jagannadha consent to the adoption? 5. Is his consent sufficient in law to validate the adoption? 6. Is the 2nd defendant a heritable bandhu of Anantaram Singh?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The consent of Jagannatha Singh, a bhinnagotra sapinda of the deceased, was sufficient to validate the adoption. 2. Kesar Singh was a heritable bandhu of Anantaram Singh and the claim of the Government must fail on this ground also.
Final Decision: The appeal was allowed and the suit was dismissed.
Spencer, J.
1. I have had the advantage of seeing the judgment which my learned brother is about to deliver. On the questions of fact I have nothing to add to what he will state beyond expressing my entire agreement with his conclusions. On the two questions of law arising out of the 5th and 6th points I wish to express my concurrence with his opinion. His opinion on the 5th point agrees also with that of Ramesam, J., in Anne Brahmayya v. Chelasami Rattayya (1922) 20 L.W. 503. I agree with them in respectfully dissenting from the view expressed by Oldfield, J., in Viswasundara Rao v. Somasundara Rao (1920) I.L.R. 43 M. 876 to the effect that the class of sapindas, whose consent should be obtained by a widow in order to supply the authority lacking in consequence of her husband having died without authorising her to adopt a son, is limited to agnates. In the judgment of Seshagiri Aiyar, J., in Kristnayya v. Lakshmipathi (1920) I.L.R. 43 M. 650 : 30 M.L.J. 265 (P.C.) the Smrithi of Yajnavalkya, which is the basis for the theory that a woman, who has no husband, father or sons, needs the advice of those who are her natural protectors, is quoted.
2. Let her father protect a maiden, her lord a married woman, sons in old age; if none of these, other gnatis; she is not fit for independence.
Here the word used is "gnatis."
3. But temporal considerations cannot be left out of account. Proximity to the deceased with respect to rights of property is also an important factor in considering who should be consulted, for the reason that those persons who would succeed to the property, if no adoption were made, are most interested in the protection of the inheritance and in restraining the widow concerned from acting capriciously (vide Sri Raghu-nadha v. Sri Brozo Kishoro (1876) L.R. 3 I.A. 154 : I.L.R. 1 M. 69 (P.C.) and Veera Basavaraju v. Balasurya Prasada Rao (1918) L.R. 45 I.A. 265 : I.L.R. 41 M. 998 (1004) : 36 M.L.J. 40(42) (P.C.). As regards the devolution of property the original text of Manu is.
(Manu IX. 187) which may be translated literally:
Whoever is unremote from the sapinda to him let his wealth belong.
The word used here is " sapinda".
4. Now neither the word gnati nor the word sapinda is synonymous with the English word " agnate", whatever may be the suggestion conveyed by the common root " gna". For sapindas undoubtedly include bhinnagotra sapindas who are cognates, and in Professor Monier Williams Dictionary "gnati " is defined as a " paternal relation, a kinsman in general, a father, a brother, a distant kinsman, one who does not participate in the oblations offered to deceased ancestors (according to the School, gnatis is a paternal and sambhandh in maternal relation; the original meaning of gnati may Be intimately acquainted). Cf. Greek (Gustoo Gnotee).
5. I am satisfied that in the passage where Mr. Ameer Ali observed in Veera Basavaraju v. Balasurya Prasada Rao (1918) L.R. 45 I.A. 265 : I.L.R. 41 M. 998 (1004) : 36 M.L.J. 40(42) (P.C.) " The Ramnad case established the proposition that in the Dravida country under the Dravidian branch of the Mitak shara Law there is force in the absence of authority from her deceased husband, a widow may adopt a son with the assent of his male agnates", and in the other passage in Krist-nayya v. Lakshmipathi (1920) I.L.R. 43 M. 650 : 30 M.L.J. 265(P.C.) where Viscount Cave observed at p. 654: " The consent required is that of a substantial majority of those agnates nearest in relationship who are capable of forming an intelligent and honest judgment on the matter", their Lordships had no intention of laying down the propositions (1914) 20 L.W. 503 that in the absence of agnates available for being consulted no adoption could be made by a widow who had failed to obtain the authority of her husband, and (1920) I.L.R. 43 M. 876 that in no circumstances should cognates be consulted. No doubt agnates should as a rule be consulted first, if there are agnates, because the principal agnat