The main legal point established in the judgment is the distinction between public and private trusts, the requirement of sanction under Section 92 of the Civil P. C., and the limitations of Section 69 of Act I of 1925 in governing suits related to religious endowments.

Wallace, J.

1. This civil revision petition is a petition asking this Court to revise the finding of the lower Court on a preliminary issue in O. S. No. 27 of 1925 on its file. The point at issue is whether the suit is maintainable without the sanction of the Advocate-General under Section 92 of the Civil P. C. or without the order of the Board of Religious Endowments under Section 69 of Act I of 1925.

2. The suit was primarily to remove the first defendant from his position as manager or managing trustee of the four plaint kattalais in the Sikkal temple, to direct the first defendant to render accounts of his management and to settle a scheme for the management of these kattalais. Only one plaintiff sued and he claims to be a co-trustee with the first defendant under the original conditions of the trust, and says that he was prevented by the first defendant from taking his proper share in the management, the first defendant setting up an exclusive right of management, as if the trust were his own private property. The plaintiffs claim, as set out in the plaint, is that, as per the terms of the trust, the kattalais form a private trust and are in the joint management of five sharers who are the plaintiff, Defendant Nos. 1, 2 and 3 and the family of Defendants No. 4 to 8. The first defendants case is that the trust is a public one, and that this allegation of joint management is wholly false, and that he. as trustee of the Sikkal temple, is also the sole trustee for these kattalais. Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 supported the plaintiff. Defendants Nos. 4 to 8 supported the first defendant.

3. The preliminary issue was whether the trust is a public or a private one, and if the former, whether sanction under Section 92, Civil P. C., or the consent of the Board under Section 69 of Act I of 1925, is necessary. As to the first point of this issue, the lower Court, accepting, as was right, the statement in the plaint, concluded that the claim was not that the trust is private in the sense that the ownership of the property was retained by the donor as his own private property, but private in the sense that while the ownership passed to the trust, the management was retained in the hands of those nominated by the donors, and that the trust was, therefore, in the nature of a public trust in that it was an endowment for performing public services in a public religious institution. This part of the finding is not seriously challenged at present here; but the respondent does not give up his right to contest the finding later on in appeal if necessary. So, I assume, then that the trust is public trust.

4. The next point is whether that being so sanction under Section 92. Civil P. C., is necessary. Now, the real test whether Section 92 applies or not is, I take it, whether the suit is fundamentally on behalf of the public for the vindication of a public right, or on behalf of a private individual for the vindication of his private rights. In the latter case, obviously, the Advocate-General as representing the public has no concern, and his sanction would not be necessary. This principle has been recognized very clearly in several cases: see Appanna Poricha v. Narasinga Poricha A. I. R. 1922 Mad. 17 Budree Das Mukim v. Chooni Lal Johurry [1908] 33 Cal. 789 Balakrishna Odayar v. Jagannada Chariar A. I. R. 1925 Mad. 820 and an unreported case of this Court A. S. No. 368 of 1919. The lower Court has clearly recognized and acted on this principle, and it seems to me that, in doing so, it has acted correctly. The case relied on by the petitioner in Muthuswami Naidu v. Rayulu Naidu A. I. R. 1925 Mad. 689 was a case in which the plaintiffs sought to alter the original scheme of management, i.e., to convert the original trust into a trust of a different nature, which they could not do until they had removed altogether the sole trustee appointed under the trust, and it was, therefore, a case under Section 92. Another case relied on by the petitioner in