The central legal point established in the judgment is the distinction between hereditary and nominated succession in the context of possession of a religious office, influencing the application of the Limitation Act and the dismissal of the suit.

Venkatasubba Rao, J.

1. The plaintiff filed the suit which gives rise to this appeal, for a declaration that he was the lawful Mahant of the Ganga Mata Mutt and for recovery of properties belonging to it. The Mutt is situated at Puri but it owns properties of considerable value in the District of Ganjam. The District Judge who tried the suit dismissed it on the ground that the plaintiffs suit was barred by limitation. No question of fact was tried in the case and the learned Judge held that on the allegations in the plaint the claim was barred. We are not therefore concerned with the truth or falsity of the statements in the plaint but the only question is whether on these averments made in it the suit is in time or is barred. If the plaint can be construed as one for possession of a hereditary office the article applicable is Article 124 of the Limitation Act, which prescribes a period of 12 years and the suit would not be barred. If, on the other hand, the claim cannot be regarded as one to a hereditary office, Article 120 which prescribes a period of six years applies and the suit would then be barred. The point to be decided is, on the allegations in the plaint, is this a suit for possession of a hereditary office.

2. In paragraph 6 of the plaint the plaintiff refers to the fact that the late Mahant Sri Madhava Das nominated him as his successor and wrote in his own hand the Guru Pranali and the Sidha Pranali containing the plaintiffs name and handed the Pranalis to the plaintiff in token of his appointment as his successor. He further says that the appointment is irrevocable and was not revoked by the late Mahant.

3. In paragraphs 8 and 9, the plaintiff alleges that the 1st defendant puts himself forward as the successor to the late Mahant on the strength of a will executed by the latter, the genuineness of which the plaintiff does not admit. He adds that he denies that the 1st defendant was nominated by the previous Mahant as his successor.

4. In para 13 he says that the 1st defendants nomination, even if true, is invalid by reason of his own previous nomination.

5. These are the principal paragraphs where the plaintiffs title to the office is set out and in these he very clearly bases his title upon nomination by the previous Mahant.

6. In paragraph 5 he says thus:

The petitioner (plaintiff) is the patta Chela which means the principal Chela and also a Chela chosen to succeed to the Mutt after the Mahant.

7. And again in paragraph 7 he says:

Moreover the petitioner (plaintiff) is the only Chela fit to become the successor left behind the late Mahant.

8. I do not think that the plaintiff puts forward in either of these two paragraphs any claim to a hereditary office. The statement that he is the principal Chela implies that there are other Chelas. Why he describes himself as "principal Chela" he does not explain. I do not think it can be said that the allegation means that he occupies a particular character, which, apart from and independent of nomination, clothes him with the right to succeed. It is not as if he has made an illegation that he is the seniormost Chela and as such entitled to succeed without the intervention of the previous Mahant. The reference in paragraph 7 to his being "the only Chela fit" again shows that he is not relying upon his filling any definite legal character which entitles him to succeed. The word fit connotes that he is personally qualified from moral and such other standpoints of view.

9. Paragraph 15 of the plaint asks for the removal of the defendant and appointment of a suitable Mahant, which means of course not necessarily the plaintiff. In paragraph 16 he reiterates his claim that he is the only person entitled according to law and custom of the Mutt.

10. On a careful reading of the plaint, I find that the claim is put forward only on the ground of nomination or appointment by the previous Mahant. The appellants learned vakils contention is, that the plaint must be so construed as if ther