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1926 Supreme(Mad) 377

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MARAS
Curgenven
Garapati Gangaraju
Versus
Pendyala Somanna
Decided On : 13 August, 1926

Proper representation in legal proceedings is crucial, and the revocability and intention of a document are key factors in determining its nature.

Headnote:

Will - Property Rights - [Section 64, Civil P. C., Sita Koer v. Munshi Deo Nath Sahay, Mohammad Abdul Ghani v. Fakhr Jahan Begam, Rajammal v. Authiammal, Harischunder Biswas v. Puri Das Das, Kaliappan Servai Karan v. Vardarajulu, Paramaswami Ayyangar v. Alamelu Nachiar Ammal, Bachu Soorayya v. Toomuloori Chinna Anjaneyalu, Doraisami v. Chidambaram Pillai, Khiarajmal v. Daim] - The court discussed the nature of a document and whether it constituted a Will or a conveyance reserving a life estate. It considered the revocability of the document, the intention of the executant, and previous case law to determine the nature of the document. The court also addressed the issue of representation in a decree against a deceased person's estate and the implications of not impleading the proper legal representative in the suit. The court cited various cases to support its findings and emphasized the importance of proper representation in legal proceedings.

Fact of the Case:

The plaintiff, the daughter's son of Kristnamma, filed a claim petition asserting his right to a portion of the family property based on a conveyance deed executed by Kristnamma. The main question was whether the deed was a Will or a conveyance reserving a life estate.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the document was not a Will but a conveyance reserving a life estate. It also held that the decree against the family estate was void as the plaintiff, the proper legal representative, was not impleaded in the suit.

Issues: The issues involved the nature of the document (Will or conveyance), the representation in the decree against the deceased's estate, and the implications of not impleading the proper legal representative.

Ratio Decidendi: The court considered the revocability of the document, the intention of the executant, and previous case law to determine the nature of the document. It also emphasized the importance of proper representation in legal proceedings.

Final Decision: The court concluded that the document was not a Will and that the decree against the family estate was void due to improper representation. The appeal was dismissed with costs.

JUDGMENT

Curgenven, J.

1. The plaintiff in this case is the daughters son of one Kristnamma and the 2nd defendant is his sonss son. The 1st defendant is the 2nd defendants father-in-law. The 1st defendant brought a suit upon a promissory note against Kristnamma and the 2nd defendant and attached the family property before judgment. Subsequently, but during the pendency of the suit, Kristnamma died. The 2nd defendant was brought on record as his legal representative and a decree was passed against the family property in his hands. In the course of the execution proceedings the plaintiff filed a claim petition asserting his right to a portion of the property on the strength of a conveyance deed executed by Kristnamma on 27th February 1917. The first question arising in this second appeal is whether the said deed is a Will or a conveyance reserving a life-estate.

2. The document on the face of it is of a non-testamentary character. It was so stamped and so registered. It is called a dakal dastaveju, which means a conveyance or settlement deed. It is true that a document which is not a Will in form, may yet be a Will in substance and effect; but as was held in Mahadeva Iyer v. Sankarasubramania Iyer [1908] 18 M. L. J. 450. if an instrument is a deed in form, in order to hold that it is testamentary or in the nature of a Will, there must be something very special in the case; and unless there are circumstances which compel the Court to treat an instrument in the form of a deed as a Will, the Court will not do so. The leading argument of the appellant is that the document created no estate in prnti. A more literal translation of the fourth sentence in para. 2 of the document is:

Therefore, on account of my affection for you, I have arranged that after my death the property shall belong to you.

3. It is certainly very difficult to derive from these words any immediate interest created in favour of the plaintiff. But the line between a Will and a conveyance reserving a life estate is a fine one, and it would be hard to define in some cases where the document has been held to be non-testamentary, wherein the personal interest which was transferred consists. A more easily applied test is that of revocability. There is nothing in the suit document to show that Kristnamma reserved the right to revoke it. On the contrary there is an undertaking not to alienate any part of the property during his lifetime. I consider that this is equivalent to a promise not to revoke the instrument, because if the executant intended to reserve that right he could not consistently have parted with the right to alienate. The same intention to give finality to the deposition is suggested by Ex. 3, which is a conveyance of a portion of the property executed jointly by Kristnamma and the plaintiff. The fact that the plaintiff was required to join is significant, and in the schedule the property is described as that which was conveyed by Kristnamma to him. This document seems also to lend some colour to the view that an immediate conveyance of interest was intended in Ex. F. I think that Kristnamma had the intention not to revoke the conveyance and this has always been regarded as one of the most important tests.

4. In Sita Koer v. Munshi Deo Nath Sahay [1903] 8 C. W. N. 614 Maclean, C. J., quoting Lord Penzance, calls it a primary test, and if established is perfectly inconsistent with the document being a Will. In that case too there were the further circumstances which were given weight to, that the document was registered as a non-testamentary document and so stamped. In Mohammad Abdul Ghani v. Fakhr Jahan Begam A. I. R. 1922 P. C. 281 the document in question was held not to be a Will, one of the grounds being as here that the executant resigned her right to make, any subsequent transfer of the property. In Rajammal v. Authiammal [1910] 33 Mad. 304 the District Judge has held affirming the District Munsifs judgment that the document was a Will, but this finding wa



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