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1926 Supreme(Mad) 392

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MARAS
Beasley
A.R.A.R.S.M. Arunachallam
Versus
C. Jagannatha Pillai
Decided On : 18 August, 1926

The main legal point established in the judgment is the requirement of registration for documents creating a charge upon immovable property, as well as the plaintiff's right to sue on a promissory note without endorsement or succession certificate.

Headnote:

Registration of Documents - Equitable Mortgage - Section 17, (1) Clause (b) of the Registration Act - A.I.R. 1923 P.C. 50 - A.I.R. 1924 Mad. 547 - Muthiah Chetty v. Kothandaramaswami Chetty [1916] 31 M.L.J. 347 - Negotiable Instruments Act - Vyravan Ghettiar v. Sreenivasa Chariar A.I.R. 1921 Mad. 68 - Kuttia Pillai v. Ranganadham [1915] 28 M.L.J. 323 - Ramanatham Chetti v. Subramanyam Chetti [1915] 28 M.L.J 372

Fact of the Case:

The defendant executed a promissory note and entered into an agreement to deposit title-deeds as an equitable mortgage. The defendant later argued that the claim was not maintainable due to lack of registration of the agreement and the letter accompanying the title-deeds.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the agreement and the letter had to be taken together, and as they created a charge upon immovable property, they required registration. The court also ruled that the plaintiff could sue on the promissory note without endorsement or succession certificate.

Issues: The issues included the requirement of registration for the agreement and letter, and the plaintiff's right to sue on the promissory note without endorsement or succession certificate.

Ratio Decidendi: The court's decision was influenced by the interpretation of Section 17, (1) Clause (b) of the Registration Act and relevant case law, including A.I.R. 1923 P.C. 50 and A.I.R. 1924 Mad. 547. The court also relied on the interpretation of the Negotiable Instruments Act and relevant case law such as Vyravan Ghettiar v. Sreenivasa Chariar A.I.R. 1921 Mad. 68.

Final Decision: The court decreed in favor of the plaintiff for the sum due on the promissory note, rejecting the defendant's arguments regarding registration and the plaintiff's right to sue on the promissory note.

JUDGMENT

Beasley, J.

1. The facts in this case are briefly as follows: The defendant was indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of Rs. 62,000 odd in respect of partnership dealings, that being his alleged ascertained share of losses of the partnership. In respect of that Rs. 62,000, the defendant executed a promissory note and having executed the promissory note on 26th May 1923 he entered into an agreement which is called memorandum of agreement relating to the deposit of title-deeds and in that agreement it is recited amongst other things after setting out the ascertained liability of the defendant:

Whereas the said C. Jagannatham Pillai has further agreed to deposit the title deeds relating to his properties his properties are then described by way of equitable mortgage to secure the repayment of the amount and interest covered by the promissory note dated 25th May 1923 executed by him.

2. It further recites that:

C. Jagannatham Pillai shall deposit the title-deeds set out in the schedule to the agreement to create thereby an equitable mortgage to secure the repayment of the amount and interest covered by the promissory note.

3. These, I think, are the only words which it is necessary in this document to refer to. It is an agreement to deposit the title-deeds to secure the repayment of a sum owing on the promissory note. On the next day namely on the 27th May the defendant wrote the following letter to the plaintiff:

I have the honour of herewith sending you with the intention of delivering and depositing the same with you as per the memorandum dated the 26th May 1923 executed by me in your favour the title-deeds and papers relating to the property.

4. It is common ground that this letter was accompanied by the title-deeds There was a clear contract on the 26th May to deposit the title deeds by way of security for the repayment of the money advanced or money, owing and on the 27th May the actual deposit of title deeds in accordance with the memorandum of agreement was made. I think it is very important that the memorandum of agreement a day before was set out in the letter which accompanied the title-deeds. On behalf of the defendant, it is contended that this claim is not maintainable because neither the memorandum of agreement nor the letter on 27th May can be given in evidence as neither have been registered.

5. It is argued that both the documents must be taken together as forming the contract between the parties, that you cannot take either the document of 26th May or the document of 27th May by itself but that you have got to take the two together and the two together, it is argued, are the contract between the parties. The whole question is whether the documents have got to be . taken together. In my view they have. The first agreement was an agreement to deposit and the second was the actual deposit in accordance with the terms of the agreement. In my view both have to be taken together. The next thing that has got to be considered is what the effect of them is when they are taken together. If taken together, if the contract is a contract which purports to create a charge upon immovable property, then clearly under Section 17, (1) Clause (b) of the Registration Act it is a document which requires registration. Admittedly in this case there has been no registration. The contract between the parties has been reduced to writing and therefore under the Evidence Act the contract being in writing the question arises whether or not the contract has got to be registered.

6. I have been referred to Velauakauya Krishnayya v. Ponnuswami Ayyar A.I.R. 1924 Mad. 547 by the plaintiff and that, it is argued, is a decision against this view. But in that case all that the Court held was that the document in question being a document subsequent to that which created a charge was merely a document which recorded the charge and the learned Chief Justice in that case emphasized very strongly the fact that it was in the past tense. That is not this






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