1926 Supreme(Mad) 492
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MARAS
Odgers
Apturu Seenayya Reddi
Versus
Apturu Mangamma
Decided On : 1 October, 1926
The main legal point established in the judgment is the requirement for a Hindu wife to demonstrate sufficient cause to live separately from her husband in order to claim maintenance, and the legal basis for such a claim.
Headnote:
Maintenance - Hindu Law - Raman Nair v. Krishnan Nambudripad A. I. R. 1922 Mad. 505, S. Bangaramma v. S. Brambaze [1908] 31 Mad. 338 - The court discussed the preliminary objection of appealability and the merits of the case, focusing on the wife's entitlement to maintenance, neglect, and abandonment by the husband.
Fact of the Case:
The plaintiff sued for maintenance, which was initially denied by the District Munsif. The District Judge reversed the decision, finding the plaintiff entitled to maintenance and remanded the case. The husband was accused of neglect and abandonment, and the wife claimed to have been ill-treated and poisoned by him.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the wife failed to prove cruelty or abandonment by the husband, and thus, the legal basis for an order for maintenance was not established. The District Judge's decision was set aside, and the decree of the District Munsif was restored with costs throughout.
Issues: The issues revolved around the wife's entitlement to maintenance, neglect, and abandonment by the husband, as well as the legal basis for an order for maintenance.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that a Hindu wife must show sufficient cause to live separately from her husband, either through violence rendering it unsafe to continue living together or continued ill-treatment amounting to legal cruelty. The court also emphasized the duty of a Hindu wife to reside with her husband and the legal requirements for claiming maintenance.
Final Decision: The appeal was allowed, the District Judge's decision was set aside, and the decree of the District Munsif was restored with costs throughout.
Odgers, J.
1. There is a preliminary objection that no appeal lies as this is a remand order by the learned District Judge on a point which is not preliminary. The suit was brought by the plaintiff for maintenance and the first issue was: "Is the plaintiff entitled to maintenance," which he found against. The learned District Judge reversed that decision, finding that the plaintiff was entitled to maintenance, and sent the case back to the District Munsif to decide the other points in issue. I think there is no doubt that under the ruling in Raman Nair v. Krishnan Nambudripad A. I. R. 1922 Mad. 505 this is a preliminary point. There is no ground, it seems to me, after that Full Bench ruling for saying that a preliminary point depends in any way on the degree of importance it may assume in the hearing of the case. Mr. Justice Coutts-Trotter ( as he then was) defines a preliminary point as a point which, when decided in the way in which it is in fact decided, determines the result of the suit. It seems to me that this matter in question here conforms exactly to that definition.
2. With regard to the merits: we have to consider whether the findings of the learned District Judge are such as to justify him in law in coming to the conclusion that the plaintiff is entitled to relief by way of separate maintenance. The only ground for the District Judges decision is that she is so entitled because of the respondents (husbands) neglect to maintain her without lawful excuse. The husband and wife lived together for about two years. It does not appear to have been a very happy time because the wife was accused of stealing some jewels belonging to the husbands brother. The matter went before a panchayat who decided that her father and brother were to pay Rs. 50 as compensation to the brother-in-law. This of course was a finding, for what it is worth, that the wife was guilty of theft. The husband appears to have been very angry on this occasion and abused his wife, and the lower Court finds that he beat her on this occasion. The District Judge, however, agreeing with the District Munsif, finds that there is no proof of violence and that the corporal chastisement administered on this occasion was not sufficient to justify her in leaving her husband s house. Nor was there any continued ill-usage which would amount in law to legal cruelty. The other incident is important because it is really the case of the wife for leaving the husbands house, and that is, she contracted an illness, as she says on account of an attempt to poison her on the part of her husband. No such attempt has been proved, but the wife was removed to hospital, and, whichever story is right as to exactly what happened or the exact terms on which she proceeded to her fathers house immediately she was discharged from hospital, there is no doubt that she did go straight from the hospital to her fathers house and she has in fact remained there ever since. The husbands version is that he wanted the wife to come straight home with him from the hospital, but that the father undertook to send her back in a few days. The District Judges conclusion is that both parties probably thought that as the wife was still under suspicion with regard to this theft it would be better if she stayed in her fathers house for some time. In this state of circumstances it is a little curious that the District Judge finds that she did not leave her husbands home of her own accord. The District Judge says that by his suspicion more than by his punishment he had made his home too hot for her and that as he admitted in his counter-petition to the petition to sue in forma pauperis she left, being unable to bear the persecution that she was subjected to by the owner of the jewels, namely, her brother- in-law. The Telugu word used means pressure and it seems to me, there being no evidence as to what this pressure was or whether it was such a worrying or mental harassment of the wife as would really amo