The main legal point established in the judgment is that the invocation of inherent power for restoration should be limited to circumstances where the specified provisions do not apply, and the reasons justifying a review must align with those specified in the relevant order or be analogous to them.

Odgers, J.

1. This is an appeal against an order of the Subordinate Judge of Nellore wherein he allowed a review of a previous order of his own and restored an execution petition which he had dismissed on the 1st March 1926. The application to restore was made under Section 151, Order 9, Rule 9 or Order 47, Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code. It is admitted that Order 9, Rule 9 does not apply and it is but faintly contended that Order 47, Rule 1, applies in view of the decision of the Privy Council in Chajju Ram v. Neki A. I. R. 1922 P. C. 112 as to the meaning of the words "or for any other sufficient reason" which occur in the rule. In that case their Lordships laid down that the words "any other sufficient reason" mean a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified previously. In the present case, the dismissal on 1st March 1926 was for default of appearance of the petitioner or his vakil. There is no doubt to my mind that Order 47, Rule 1, can have no application to the present case. The petitioner is thrown back on Section 151 and he argues that as there is no provision in the Code other than Order 21, Rule 57 with regard to dismissals of execution applications for default the dismissal must have been under Section 151 and restoration of the petition mast also fall under the same provision.

2. It may be pointed out that under Order 21, Rule 57 the Court is not bound to dismiss the application in default of appearance. Stress is laid on the case in Bholu v. Ram Lal A. I. R. 1921 Lah. 67 wherein it was held that by virtue of its inherent power a Court can restore an application for execution after it has dismissed it for default and that it should do so notwithstanding that the applicant has an alternative remedy if he satisfies the Court that it should exercise its inherent jurisdiction ex debito justitiae. That case has been disapproved in a recent case of this Court reported in Narayanan Chettiar v. Muthu Chettiar A. I. R. 1926 Mad. 980 which also held that the absence of a pleader is not a ground for review. 51 M. L. J. 219, Foll. That was a matter in execution and the learned Judges held inter alia that Order 9, Civil P. C., does not apply to execution proceedings and that a Court has no power to restore to file an application which was dismissed for default. They also point out that the fact that a fresh application for execution may be barred by limitation is not a ground for invoking the inherent power of the Court, a consideration which seems to have weighed with the learned Judges of the Lahore High Court in Bholu v. Ram Lal A. I. R. 1921 Lah. 67.

3. It is then said that there is an inherent power of review, reliance being placed on Mani Lal v. Durga Prasad A. I. R. 1924 Patna 673 This case seems to me to be no authority for us after the case in Narayanan Chettiar v. Muthu Chettiar A. I. R. 1926 Mad. 980 The matter was one of Court-fee and the learned Judges held that as there is no appeal from an order fixing a valuation or demanding an additional Court-fee the Court has ample power to review its decision for good and sufficient reason. Apart from Order 47, Rule 1 it has such an inherent power under Section 151 to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice. It seems to me to be a very strong proposition to say that when an execution petition has been dismissed under the Courts extraordinary power that extraordinary power should be again invoked in order to restore the petition. As a last alternative, it was suggested that although there may be no power to review under Section 151, there must be a power to restoration. This seems to me to be directly negatived by the decision in Narayanan Chettiar v. Muthu Chettiar A. I. R. 1926 Mad. 980.

4. The whole trouble has arisen through the Subordinate Judge observing that he takes this to be an application for review of his order. Had he been simply content to set aside his order on good cause shown it is probable that we should have