The court emphasized the importance of applying the statutory definition of reconstruction and concluded that the offense defined in Section 317(c) was of a different character from the facts of the case.

Curgenven, J.

1. The petitioner was convicted by the Stationary Sub-Magistrate of Narasapur of an offence under Section 317 (a) of the District Municipalities Act, Madras Act V of 1920, namely, with commencing the reconstruction of a building without the permission of the Chairman, Municipal Council, Palacole, and was sentenced to pay a fine Rs. 50. In appeal the learned Joint Magistrate altered the conviction to one under Section 317 (c) of the Act, which renders punishable the carrying on or completion of a construction or reconstruction in contravention of any provision contained in the Act or of any rule or bye-law made there under, or of any direction or requisition lawfully given, or made and reduced the fine to Rs. 25.

2. It is now argued that the learned Joint Magistrate has failed to apply the definition of reconstruction which is contained in Section 3 (24) of the Act. In cases where reconstruction is partial only, that definition requires that the re-erection to constitute reconstruction should be done after more than one-half of the cubical contents of the building have been taken down or burnt down. The Joint Magistrate applies what he calls the test of common-sense, namely, whether so many walls were rebuilt and such material alterations made that it can be reasonably said that there was a reconstruction of the house. This method of applying the words of the statute has not been supported before me and I think it is plainly untenable. It should have been found whether the test furnished by the definition had been satisfied in order to find whether a reconstruction within the terms of the Act had been undertaken. The Joint Magistrate then goes on to remark that at the date fixed for the offence in the charge, namely, 17-6-25 it was alleged that part of the reconstruction had already been done, so that there was no commencement on that date, and, as I understand his judgment he accepts this view and a logical conclusion from it was that no conviction under Section 317 (a) could be sustained. Accordingly he altered the finding to one under Section 317 (c) with which the accused was not charged. It appears to me that, the offence defined in Section 317 (c) is of quite a different character and that the essence of it is that after reconstruction has been commenced an order is passed to prohibit its carrying on or completion except upon certain terms and that that order is disobeyed. The facts of the present case do not substantiate an offence of that kind and I do not think that the petitioner should have been convicted of it in the circumstances. I must therefore set aside the finding and sentence imposed by the appellate Court.

3. In view of the length of time which has elapsed since the act forming the subject-matter of the charge was committed, of the somewhat technical character of the alleged offence and of the doubt which still exists whether a prosecution under Section 317 (a) would be successful, I think there are sufficient grounds for not ordering a further trial. In these circumstances, the accused is acquitted and the fine, if any, will be refunded.