The central legal point established in the judgment is the application of legal provisions and precedents, including the Registration Act, Transfer of Property Act, and Specific Relief Act, to determine the validity of documents and the enforceability of agreements.

1. The facts out of which this second appeal arises may be shortly stated as follows:

2. The second defendant is the jenmi of the suit land. The 1st defendant has been holding it under a kanom dated 28th January 1909 (Ex. I) for 12 years. On the 5th January 1919 the 2nd defendant executed a melcharath in favour of the plaintiff, Ex. A, and the present suit is filed on its basis for redemption of the kanom. The 1st defendant pleaded that there is an agreement between him and the jenmi for a renewal of the kanom dated 19th December 1918, (Ex. III); and the kanom was actually renewed by a registered document Ex. IV dated 19th December 1920. It is pleaded that the plaintiffs melcharath was obtained with notice of the defendants agreement for renewal.

3. The District Munsif found that Ex. III was not a genuine document and decreed the plaintiffs suit. What he meant was that Ex. III was not executed on the date it bears; not that it was not executed by the jenmi.

4. On appeal the District Judge found that Ex. III was a genuine document and that it was executed on the date it bears and there is no reason to suspect that it was a collusive document. He then observed:

The whole thing depends upon the question whether there was any agreement to renew on 4th Dhanu, as pleaded by Defendants 1 and 2. If there has been such an agreement the law fixes the plaintiff with notice of it and the melcharath obtained by the plaintiff with notice of that agreement cannot prevail. This position, or rather this view of the case, is accepted as correct before me by the vakils on both sides.

5. On this view he allowed the appeal and dismissed the plaintiffs suit. The plaintiff files the second appeal.

6. In second appeal Mr. Krishna Variar who appears for the appellants raises two points. First that Ex. III is inadmissible in evidence. His contention is that though Ex. III purports to be a receipt, it is really an agreement to lease; and as the definition of lease under the Registration Act includes also an agreement to lease, the document requires registration according to the Full Bench decision in Narayana Chetty v. Subbayya Servai [1912] 35 Mad. 63 Mr. C. T. Govindan Nambiar who appears for the respondent points out that the scope of that Full Bench decision has been limited by the decision in Hanumantha Kumari Debi v. Midnapur Zamindari Co. [1920] 47 Cal. 485 The appellants counsel does not deny this but he contends that Ex. III amounts to a document operating as a present demise within the meaning of the Privy Council decision above quoted and argues that Ex, III is inadmissible in evidence. It seems to me that the agreement to lease was really contemporaneous with Ex. III, that there is really no oral agreement to lease made at a time far apart and distinct from the time of Ex. III. At the same time it seems to me that Ex. III -was not intended to reduce to writing the terms of the agreement though it refers to them fully. It shows that the lease is to be renewed on the receipt of a further manusham of rupees Thirty- six and Rs. 30-14-9 have been received as part payment towards this manusham of Rs. 36. It also shows that the balance of the manusham Rs. 5-1-3 was to be paid on the date of the demise and it was not paid on that date. It is unnecessary for me to pursue this question whether Ex. III is to be regarded as an agreement to lease. Assuming it is an agreement to lease, I am clear that it cannot amount to a document operating as a "present" demise, because the parties did not intend a demise until the payment of Rs. 5-1-3 and so long as that amount remained unpaid no operative demise could be intended. It is true, as Mr. Krishna Variar contends and as it has been held in Ramjoo Mahomed v. Haridas Mullick A. I. R. 1925 Cal. 1087 that the mere fact that another document of lease was afterwards executed has no bearing on the construction of the agreement. It is not cause there is another document later on that I hold that Ex. III is not ope