The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of inheritance rights and powers of alienation for maintenance under Hindu Law, emphasizing the daughter's right to maintenance and rejecting the imposition of greater restrictions on the daughter than on the widow as heir after the succession opened.

Miller, J.

1. In my opinion the appeal must be allowed. I have had the advantage of reading the judgment which my learned brother has prepared and in which he has set out the facts and agreeing in his conclusion I desire only to make a few observations.

2. There is no question that a widow is entitled to provide for her own maintenance by alienating a portion of her inheritance, if she cannot provide for it otherwise. The Subordinate Judge holds that a daughters powers are more restricted apparently because the widow has a claim on her husbands estate during his life-time and a daughter has no such claim against her father once she is married.

3. I do not suppose that the Subordinate Judge intended to suggest that it is a rule of Hindu Law that the rights of an heir in the estate of an ancestor to whom he has succeeded, are in direct proportion to his claims against the property during the life-time of the ancestor. My learned brother demonstrates the baselessness of any such idea. I think the Subordinate Judge means rather to suggest that the origin of the widows succession to her husband is her right to be maintained by him and consequently she has a right to get her maintenance out of the property inherited, whereas the origin of the succession of a daughter to her father is different.

4. If this is his meaning, I am unable to hold that his premises are sufficiently well established to serve as a safe foundation for a differentiation between the legal rights of the widow and those of the daughter. The passage which he quotes from Maynes Hindu Law contains some suggestions by Mr. Mayne of a possible reason why the daughter was not allowed to take an estate equal in extent to that of the son, but they are pat forward only as suggestions based on general principles of religious efficacy and not as based on any statements of ancient writers; and Mr. Mayne does not suggest that the daughters rights are or ever were less than the widows in law. And finally if it be suggested that the right to maintenance gives an equity to the widow which the daughter has not, that consideration would apply only to the married daughter, for a maiden daughter has the right of maintenance as against her father and if she is orphaned while a maiden she should have the same rights in the inheritance as her mother would have if she survived her husband. And we have not been referred to any text or decisions which sug. gests the propriety of drawing any distinction between the extent of the estate inherited from her father by a widowed daughter and that taken by a maiden; nor do I think it was suggested to us that we should now make any such distinction.

5. The facts make the present case a strong one in favour of the appellant. She had to borrow money to maintain herself while out of possession of the property and if it was her duty, or her right, to fight the person in possession in order to recover the property, it would seem difficult to see why she was not bound or entitled to keep herself alive for the struggle; if she can charge the estate for the expenses of counsel, for court fees and the subsistence allowance of witnesses, why not for the necessary expenses of the principle combatant. Even the income of the property was withheld from her and by the plaintiff in this case himself.

6. I would allow the appeal and make the decree proposed in the judgment of my learned brother.

Sadasiva Aiyar, J.

7. The 2nd defendant is the appellant before this Court in the above Second Appeal. One Ammayalingam died in 1893 leaving a widow and a daughter (1st defendant) as his successive heirs and a divided nephew (plaintiff) who had a contingent reversionary interest in the estate of Ammayalingam, (that is contingent on his surviving 1st defendants mother and 1st defendant) and subject to all the valid alienation (if any) made by them as female heirs succeeding to the property of a male owner. The suit out of which this Second Appeal has arisen was brought by p