The main legal point established in the judgment is that the interpretation of the presumption of whether a person is alive or dead, as provided in the Indian Evidence Act, does not include a presumption of how long a person was alive or at what time he died, and that any presumption of fact would depend entirely on the circumstances of the case.

1. This is a suit for possession of a house site. The plaintiff stated in her plaint that the house was purchased by her elders, that her husband left the place and went away to foreign places, that she and her father-in-law lived in it subsequently for 5 or 6 years, that the father-in-law then died, that she then continued to live in the house for some time till it fell down, that she then went to live with her brother in another village and that when she returned to the village in 1908 she found that the defendants had trespassed on it.

2. The defendants put the plaintiff to the proof of her title and possession. The case that the plaintiff attempted to make out at the hearing was that she succeeded to the house as the heir of her husband. No positive evidence was adduced to shew that her husband survived her father-in-law. She could not succeed unless the Court found that she did so. It is argued by the learned Vakil for the appellant that the appellate court was bound to presume that her husband lived for a period of 7 years after he left the village and that as the father-in-law died before the expiration of the 7 years the husband must be taken to have survived him. Reliance is placed on the combined effect of sections 107 and 108 of the Indian Evidence Act The former section states that if a person is proved to have lived within a period of 30 years and the question is whether he is alive or dead the onus is on the party who asserts that he is dead. This is qualified by Section 108 which lays down that when it is proved that a person has not been heard of for 7 yerrs by those who would naturally have heard of him if he had been alive the burden of proving that he is alive is on the person who affirms it. It is argued that in as much as under Section 107 it is enough to prove that a man was alive within 30 years to throw the onus of proving his death on the party who asserts it there is a presumption that he lived during the 30 years and that Section 108 modifies it only where it is proved that the person was not heard of for 7 years. We are unable to agree with the appellants Vakil as to the meaning to be put on Section 107. Both sections 107 and 108 deal with the procedure to be followed when a question is raised before a court as to whether a person is alive or dead. Neither of these sections in our opinion lays down any presumption as to how long a man was alive or at what time he died. The contention for the appellant is not supported by any Indian authority cited before us. On the other hand the view we take is supported by the pronouncement of the Calcutta High Court in Naiki v. Lalsahu (1909) I.L.R. 37 C. 103 and of the Allahabad High Court in a recent Full Bench decision in Muhammed Sherif v. Bande Ali (1911) I.L.R. 34 A. 36: A passage from Lawson on Presumptive Evidence has been read to us which goes to shew that in America there is a presumption that aman was alive until the expiration of the period of 7 years from the time that he was last heard of. That in our opinion is not the Indian Law. Then it is argued that there is at least a presumption of fact that the husband was alive for 7 years after he was heard of. Assuming that a Court may make a presumption that a man was alive during some period after he was heard of, it would depend entirely on the circumstances whether the Court would make such presumption or not. We are unable to say that on the facts placed before us, the Court should-have inferred as a presumption of fact that plaintiffs husband was alive when his father died even if we would be justified in interfering in second appeal on the ground that a presumption of fact has not been made. We are therefore unable to interfere with the finding on the question of title.

3. Then it is contended that the finding on the question of plaintiffs possession cannot legally be upheld. The rinding perhaps is not quite satisfactory. But the plaintiffs own case was that though she lived in the house for