1912 Supreme(Mad) 377
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MARAS
S Aiyar, S Aiyar
Kadungoth Purakkal Ammalu And
Versus
Kadungoth Purakkal Meenakshi
Decided On : 13 August, 1912
Daughters of a Hindu are entitled to partition of their life-interests, and the unregistered partition deed did not prevent the plaintiffs from seeking other reliefs.
Headnote:
Partition - Hindu Law - Registration Act - 13 M. 281, 20 M. 19, 16 M. 341 - The court discussed the entitlement of daughters of a Hindu to partition of their life-interests, the effect of unregistered partition deed, and the right to enforce partition without reference to the terms of the original partition deed.
Fact of the Case:
The plaintiffs, daughters of a deceased Thiyya, sought partition of the property inherited from their father. They alleged that the defendant substituted a forged deed for the genuine partition deed and got it registered. The suit was dismissed on the grounds that the proper remedy was to seek recovery of possession and that daughters of a Hindu are only entitled to partition of their life-interests.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the daughters of a Hindu are entitled to partition of their life-interests and that the plaintiffs were entitled to a declaration that the registered instrument was a forgery, essential for them to seek a fresh partition. The court reversed the decrees of the lower courts and remanded the suit for fresh disposal.
Issues: Entitlement of daughters to partition, effect of unregistered partition deed, and right to seek fresh partition.
Ratio Decidendi: Daughters of a Hindu are entitled to partition of their life-interests. The plaintiffs were entitled to a declaration that the registered instrument was a forgery, essential for them to seek a fresh partition. The unregistered partition deed did not prevent the plaintiffs from suing for other reliefs.
Final Decision: The court reversed the decrees of the lower courts and remanded the suit for fresh disposal.
Sundara Aiyar, J.
1. The plaintiffs are two out of three daughters of a deceased Thiyya. They instituted the suit against the 3rd daughter, the defendant, for partition of the property they inherited from their father. It was alleged in the plaint that a partition deed was executed about 9th January 1909, that this document was in the possession of the defendant, who undertook to present it for registration, that defendant, subsequently, substituted a forged deed for that document and succeeded in getting the forged instrument registered. The plaintiffs say that they are, therefore, entitled to a decree for partition and a declaration that the instrument of partition registered on the 9th January 1909 was a forgery and not binding on the plaintiffs. The suit has been dismissed on two grounds. The first ground is that the plaintiffs proper remedy was to seek for recovery of possession of the properties which, according to their case, were allotted to them under the terms of the genuine partition deed put forward by them. The second ground is that the daughters of a Hindu are not entitled to absolute partition, but only to partition of their rights to enjoy the properties during their life-time.
2. With regard to the latter ground, I may at once state that there is nothing in the plaint to show that the plaintiffs seek a partition which would affect the rights of the reversioner or their mutual rights of survivorship on the death of any one of them. It is settled law now that the daughters of a Hindu are entitled to partition of their life-interests and there is no reason why the plaintiffs should not have a decree for partition which would make them and the defendant divided with respect to their life-interests.
3. With respect to the other ground of decision, the instrument of partition put forward by the plaintiffs proved ineffective as the defendant kept it away and it was never registered. The document was undoubtedly compulsorily registrable. See Lakshmamma v. Kameswara 13 M. 281.
4. It is urged by Mr. Govindaragava Iyer for the respondent that, as a partition need rot be evidenced by writing at all, the plaintiff should have sought recovery of the properties allotted to them at the partition. But the plaintiffs did not say that it was intended to effect a partition except by means of the document relied on by them. They did not say that there was any partition apart from that document is then argued that the plaintiffs could have sued for the recovery of the properties allotted to them on the footing of an agreement to divide, which, it is contended, was enough to effect a severance of status between the parties. But here, again, it is not the plaintiffs case that there was an agreement to divide which was intended to be enforceable apart from the partition deed itself. Of course, the parties to any instrument would necessarily agree upon certain terms which might, in one sense, be said to constitute an agreement between them. But the question is, did they enter into an agreement which was intended to be obligatory apart from, and without the execution of, the document subsequently executed? As I understand the plaintiffs case, they did not put forward any such completed agreement previous to the execution of the partition deed, nor was her present contention raised by the defendant in her written statement. I am of opinion that the lower Courts are also wrong in holding that the plaintiffs were not entitled to the declaration that the registered instrument was a forgery. This was not merely an incidental relief. It was essential for the plaintiffs to get the declaration in order to be entitled to seek a fresh partition. The plaintiffs were, in any event, entitled to the declaration if they could establish that the document was a forgery.
5. I would, therefore, reverse the decrees of the Courts below and remand the suit to the Court of first instance for fresh disposal according to law. All costs up to date must abide