The main legal point established in the judgment is that a petition does not lie under Section 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code to revise the excluded proceedings, and the recognized procedure for exercising revisional jurisdiction over the proceedings of inferior courts is by calling for the records under Section 435.

1. This is a petition put in under Section 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code asking for revision of an order of the Joint magistrate of Tellicherry in Miscellaneous Case No. 30 of 1909 on the 16th October 1911 passed under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The preliminary objection is taken that the Court in the exercise of its revisional powers under the Code cannot deal with orders made under that section and reliance is placed on Section 435, Clause 3, which provides that proceedings under Chapter XII are not proceedings within the meaning of that section. It is contended however on behalf of the petitioners that the Court can exercise its powers under Section 439 without calling in aid Section 435. The point has been argued at great length and most ably by Mr. Seshagiri Aiyar. He relies on the words "which otherwise comes to its knowledge "in Section 439, Clause (1) and contends that that phrase has reference to action taken by the High Court on petition in contradistinction to actirn taken when the record has been called for "by itself "in the earlier words of the section which, he contends, is limited to action by the High Court suo motu. He further relies on similar words in Section 438 which, he argues, entitle a Sessions Judge or District Magistrate likewise to examine records of proceedings of inferior Magisterial Officers otherwise than by calling for the records under Section 435. He admits that the result of this interpretation of the sections would be that the Sessions Judge or District Magistrate cannot call for and examine and report for the orders of the High Court the records of proceedings of inferior Criminal Courts under Section 144, chapter XII and Section 176, but that they can under some power referred to as "otherwise," but the authority for which does not appear, get the record without calling for it and report the case for the orders of the High Court under Section 438. That is to say, that the ordinary channel by which proceedings under these sections and all other judgments and orders, are examined by the Sessions Judge and the District Magistrate and reported for orders, is blocked up by the Legislature with respect to these proceedings, but that those officers can still exercise the power of reporting if the record comes before them in some other manner not explained. Now this could hardly have been the intention of the legislature. The recognized procedure by which those Courts exercise revisional jurisdiction over the proceedings of inferior Courts ia by calling for the records under Section 435. The legislature has taken away that jurisdiction, persumably intending that these proceedings which are all of a special nature should not be interfered with either by the High Court or the Sessions Judge or the District Magistrate. These proceedings are none of them criminal or punitive. Sections 143, 144 and 145 are prohibitive in the interest of the public peace and public good. Section 176 is a special section empowering a Magistrate to hold an investigation where any person dies when in the custody of the police. We have no doubt that the legislature intended to leaVe action under these sections where cause is shown to the unfettered discretion of the local Magistracy; and we cannot from the use of this word "otherwise" in Section 438 infer a power in the Sessions Judge and the District Magistrate to interfere with such orders when they are expressly forbidden by Section 435 to call for the records. In our opinion the words in Section 439 "the record of which has been called for by itself are not limited to cases where High Court acts suo motu. It must be borne in mind that although when the earlier Criminal Procedure Codes were passed the legislature had chiefly in view the exercise of revisional powers by the High Court and those superior ofticers on inspection of the calendars, it recognized as early as 1872 that parties could invoke these powers by petition. But in any case whe