1920 Supreme(Mad) 129
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MARAS
S Aiyar, Spencer
Sooratha Singa
Versus
Kanaka Singa
Decided On : 26 March, 1920
The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation and application of customs in Hindu Law, the burden of proof, and the validity of adoption based on the evidence and admission of the parties.
Headnote:
Adoption - Hindu Law - Minakshi v. Ramanada 11 M. 49 at p. 55 (F.B.) : 11 Ind. Jur.449 : Ind. Dec. (N. s ) 35, Vayidinada v. Appu 6 M. 44 (F.B.) : 3 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 427; Appayya Bhattar v. Vengu Bhattar 15M.L.J. 211 - 11 M. 49 at p. 55, 6 M. 44, 15M.L.J. 211 - The court discussed the validity of adoption in Hindu Law, the existence of custom, burden of proof, and the interpretation of oral evidence and customs in reaching its decision.
Fact of the Case:
The court examined the evidence and circumstances surrounding the adoption case, including the burden of proof and the validity of the adoption according to customs observed by the parties.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the adoption was valid according to the customs observed by the parties, considering the evidence and the admission of the plaintiff.
Issues: The issues included the validity of the adoption according to customs, the burden of proof, and the interpretation of oral evidence and customs.
Ratio Decidendi: The court shifted the burden of proof to the plaintiff based on his admission in Exhibit A, considered the widespread custom against the supposed rule based on the text relating to the reflection of a son, and accepted the evidence as sufficient to establish the custom allowing the adoption of a brothers daughters son.
Final Decision: The court accepted the finding and dismissed the second appeal with costs.
1. The general rule of Hindu Law is against the validity of the adoption in this case Minakshi v. Ramanada 11 M. 49 at p. 55 (F.B.) : 11 Ind. Jur.449 : Ind. Dec. (N. s ) 35, but this rule may be varied by custom, and such a custom has been held to obtain in the southern districts of the Madras Presidency Vayidinada v. Appu 6 M. 44 (F.B.) : 3 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 427; Appayya Bhattar v. Vengu Bhattar 15M.L.J. 211. The lower Appellate Court has not found upon the evidence whether such a custom exists in the caste, of plaintiff and defendant or in South Kanara, which does not form part of the southern districts. The appellant is responsible for all the costs of this litigation, and we direct him to pay all costs incurred up to this day before the 15th September 1919. Upon payment of the costs before that day, we direct the District Judge to record a finding upon the following issue:
2. Is the adoption in this case valid according to the customs observed by the parties?
3. No additional evidence will be taken. In default of payment the appeal will stand dismissed with costs.
4. The finding is to be returned before the 15th of October 1919, and seven days will be allowed for filing objections.
5. In compliance with the order contained in the above judgment the District Judge of South Kanara submitted the following
Finding
6. In this case, I am asked to submit a finding on the evidence on record on the following point:
Is the adoption in this case valid according to the customs observed by the parties?
2. Before considering the evidence, which is meagre, in this case I think that it is necessary to refer to the circumstances under which the evidence was adduced.
7. The issue framed by the Munsif is worded thus: whether the defendant has not been truly and validly adopted by the plaintiff? Thus, it is seen that the burden of proof is thrown on plaintiff and, therefore, the defendant must have thought that if there is not mush evidence on plaintiffs aide he need not adduce much evidence.
8. The adoption, deed is a registered, document which contains a special reference to the custom, It is a deed executed by plaintiff himself and, when he himself admits the custom in the registered document, it is strong evidence against him and, unless he proves that he made the statement under a mistake or other justifying circumstance, it may very well be presumed that it is a correct statement of facts. In this case it is not shown that there is any justifying circumstance. There fore Exhibit A affords a strong piece of evidence against plaintiff.
3. Apparently, therefore, it is for plaintiff to shift the burden on defendant but he has not succeeded in doing so. P.W. No. 1 is plaintiff himself and he is interested. Further, he contradicts Exhibit A. The next witness is P.W. No. 2 who is the natural father of defendant. His evidence has been disbelieved by all the Courts in this case on other points. So, he cannot be relied on this point also. Further, it must be remarked that he is also a party to Exhibit A as an attest or. He was the person who gave away defendant in adoption and it was then that Exhibit A was executed and the attestation of this witness taken, and so he may be presumed to have known the contents of Exhibit A when he attested it. So, his present evidence must be received with very great caution.
9. It is argued that he gives evidence against his own interest, but I am not certain of that, because we do not know whether he admits the existence of any ancestral property in his hands. Probably, he may say that the properties in his hands are all his self-acquisitions and that his sons have no right to claim them as a matter of right.
10. Defendants mother died and afterwards P.W. No. 2 married a second wife and has children by her and he does not care for defendant at all after the death of his (defendants) mother.
4. Another fact to be considered in weighing the evidence in this case is the impression which the parties and the Munsif were un