The main legal point established in the judgment is that an irregularity of such a serious nature as to render impossible the publicity which affords one main security for the fairness of public sales must be deemed to be an illegality.

Oldfield, J.

1. These proceedings were marked in the lower Court by grave irregularities; find and it is the more necessary that in correcting. these irregularities, we should be careful to do nothing which would inflict unfair prejudice on either party.

2. The sale, which is the subject of these proceedings, was according to the proclamation to be held by the Central Nazir of the Cuddalore District Court on 10th July 1919 and it was held accordingly. On the evening of that day the judgment-debtor represented to the Court that bidders had not come and that the sale was open to objection on other grounds, with which we are not concerned. Afterwards, and this was material in connexion with the representation that bidders had not come, he brought to the notice of the Nazir that the process-server charged with the. duty of making the proclamation in the village had proclaimed that the sale would be held not by the Central Nazir at Cudda lore but by the District Munsif S Court of Villupuram. This communication from the judgment-debtor to the Nazir was brought to the notice of the Court on the next day, 11th July 1919, and I am constrained to express my disapproval of the Courts method of doing business by accepting representation of this kind made by a subordinate officer. Such complaints should be considered by the Court only when they are made to it in open Court in the usual way.

3. The Court then, however, at once cancelled the sale of the three items of property which had boon sold the previous day, of which the second and third items, those purchased by the appellant are the subjects of the present appeal. It also directed the refund to the purchasers of their deposits and lastly it ordered that a fresh sale should be held on 20th August on a fresh proclamation. It does not appear that any communication of these orders was made, at all events at the time, to the present appellant. For, on 24th July 1919, he paid into Court the remainder of the purchase money due from him, and on 12th August 1919 applied for confirmation of sale and the grant of sale certificate; and again this cancellation of the sale was obviously an irregularity of considerable moment.

4. On 29th July 1919, the Court had obtained a draft proclamation, apparently from the decree-holder, and altered the date fixed for sale to 4th September 1919. Later, it may be said that as regards items other than 2 and 3, to which I shall return, the Court passed an order that the original sale should be continued as it was the Courts own fault that it was not held properly and as, properly speaking, there was no sale; and later on the sale was stopped by an order of this Court, dated (5th November 1919.

5. To go back to items 2 and 3: on the purchasers application for confirmation of sale and sale certificate of 12th August 1919 notice was issued to the decree-holder, who contended, that the sale should be set aside, that a resale should be ordered, and that the purchasers petition should be dismissed; and in these proceedings the order now under appeal was passed.

6. It is material that there has in this case boon an order (now appealed against) which was passed after notice to all concerned, and which was passed after every opportunity had been given for the production of evidence. In these circumstances, greatly as we must regret the irregular manner in which the then District Judge, Mr. Edgington, passed the order by which the sale was in the first instance set aside, we think we can disregard that order and deal with the matter simply with reference to what had happened afterwards in connexion with the application of 12th August 1919. As I have pointed out, there was no prejudice to the appellant, the purchaser, or to any one else owing to any omission of the Court to hear them or to take evidence. These proceedings were perfectly regular and we therefore examine the order now under appeal simply on its 1 merits and with out regard-to what had happened at the earli