1920 Supreme(Mad) 149
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MARAS
S Ayyar
Kandasami Chetty
Versus
Ramalinga Chetty
Decided On : 1 April, 1920
In Small Cause suits, judges must provide some indication of their reasoning to enable effective revision by the higher court and ensure parties' satisfaction.
Headnote:
Judgment - Small Cause Suit - Order XX, Rule 4 - Summary
Fact of the Case:
The District Munsif's judgment found the plaint claim to be true without providing reasons. The court considered whether this judgment should be accepted, citing conflicting interpretations of Order XX, Rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Code.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the judgment lacked sufficient reasoning and should be reversed, emphasizing the importance of judges providing reasons for their conclusions in Small Cause suits.
Issues: The issue was whether the District Munsif's judgment, which lacked reasoning, should be accepted by the higher court.
Ratio Decidendi: The court emphasized the need for judges in Small Cause suits to provide some indication of their reasoning to enable effective revision by the higher court and to ensure parties' satisfaction and discourage a habit of slackness in the lower court.
Final Decision: The judgment was reversed, and the case was sent back to the District Munsif for disposal with the instruction to provide reasons for the decision.
1. The judgment of the District Munsif under revision is in these terms, "Point; Is the plaint claim true? I find the plaint claim true." The question for consideration is whether this is a judgment which should be accepted by this Court. Mr. Srinivasagopala Chariar, who appeared for the respondent, has drawn my attention to the language of Order XX, Rule 4 Clauses (1) and (2) of the Civil Procedure Code and contended that, in a Small Cause suit, the Judge is not bound to give reasons for his decision. He is supported by the Calcutta High Court in Protap Chandra Dutt v. Abhimanini Surini 48 Ind. Cas. 752. On the other hand, in Malik Rahmat v. Shiva Prasad 13 A. 533 : A.W.N. (1891) 172 : 7 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 337 Mr. Justice Mahmood and in Bai Jasoda v. Bamansha 23 B. 334 : 12 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 222 one of the Judges of the Bench examined the materials placed before them to find out whether the Small Cause Judge had applied his mind to the consideration of the evidence adduced before him. I may at once say, with reference to the observations contained in the judgment of Farran, C.J., in Bai Jasoda v. Bamansha 23 B. 334 : 12 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 222, that I am not prepared to act upon the suggestion. The learned Chief Justice says; "In a case where there is nothing to excite suspicion, and where the plaintiff has given such proof of her claim as the law requires, the plaintiff is entitled, and this Court is entitled, to have some indication from the Judge of the point upon which he dismisses the suit, to show that he is not acting from mere caprice or in ignorance of the rules of law which regulate the proof requisite to establish a plaintiffs claim." The learned Judge prefaces this with a remark by saying, "In many cases the point for determination which forms the basis for dismissing the suit, is obvious upon the face of the proceedings." With all deference, this seems to me to necessitate an enquiry on the part of the High Court whether the case is one in which upon the face of it, the unsatisfactory judgment of the lower Court should be accepted or is one which should be further examined notwithstanding the unsatisfactory and uninforming nature of the judgment under revision. Now this would cast more work upon the High Court than Section 25 of the Small Cause Courts Act requires. In a given case, whether a judgment should be looked upon with suspicion or whether it is one where, despite the meagre judgment given by the lower Court, the High Court should see whether the parties have not been injured will not be an easy process and I am not, therefore, prepared to make the distinction suggested. Once the Court is compelled to embark upon an enquiry as to whether a particular judgment should be scrutinized or not, it would be tantamount to the Court examining for itself the materials which were available to the lower Court and judging for itself whether the decision has been properly arrived at by the lower Court. I am free to admit that the interpretation sought to be planed upon Order XX, Rule 4, would appeal to Judges in different ways. Speaking for myself, I have been under the impression while at the Bar that in this Court it had always been insisted upon that the Judge of the Small Cause Court should give some reasons which would satisfy the High Court that he had applied his mind to the materials placed before him. Brought up in that tradition, while sitting in the Admission Court, I have always insisted upon the lower Court exercising Small Cause jurisdiction giving some indication as to what was in its mind, so that I may be in a position to say whether its conclusion is right or not. There are three reasons for this attitude of mind. First of all, the High Court, in exercising its powers of revision under Section 25, is really supervising the work of the lower Court, in order to enable it effectually to do its work, the lower Court must give us some materials upon which we can say that it has done its duty property. Ot