The main legal principle established is that a purchaser's remedy, when the vendor's title to the land is superseded by a superior title, is limited to damages for breach of warranty of title.

1. The plaintiff brought certain specific land from the first defendant, a Mahomedan. The first defendant had bought this land from a coparcener in a Hindu family. The other co-parceners instituted a suit for partition and it was during the pendency of that suit that the first defendant sold the land to the plaintiff. By the decree in the suit for partition the land with which we are concerned was not allotted to the vendor of the first defendant but some other land was given to him instead. According to the dictum of the learned Judges of this Court in Nanjayya v. Shanmuga (1918) I.L.R. 38 Mad. 684 under such circumstances so far as any question lay between the first defendant and the coparcener from whom he bought the land, the first defendant would be entitled to whatever was substituted by any decree for partition for the land which he had bought from the co-parcener. This principle seems to have been acquiesced in two other decisions of this Court, one of which is reported in Sabapathi Pillai v. Thandavaraya Odayar (1919) I.L.R. 43 Mad. 309 : 37 M.L.J. 620 and we are prepared for the purposes of this argument to assume that that proposition of law is correct. Even then it is difficult to see how it avails the plaintiff in this suit. The plaintiff has not bought the land from a Hindu co-parcener who according to Hindu law would have a right to demand partition of the family property and to get the share due to him. The plaintiff has bought certain specific land from the first defendant who is a Mahomedan and between them there can be no question of working out any such equity as is mentioned in, Manjayya v. Shunmuga (1913) I.L.R, 38 Mad. 684. When analysed, the position is simply this. A sells a particular parcel of land to B. It is found that A has no title to the land. Can it be said that B is entitled to ask A to convey to him some other land in place of what he bought. When stated in these words, the position of the plaintiff would be quite untenable and it is difficult to see why the character of the superior title by which the title of the vendor in the land which he purported to sell is defeated, should make any difference to the vendees rights. As the vendors title to the land in dispute has been superseded by a superior title, the only remedy open to the vendee is damages for breach of warranty of title. It is brought to our notice that in Sabapathi Pillai v. Thandavaraya Odayar (1919) I.L.R. 43 Mad. 309 the plaintiff was a purchaser at Court auction in execution of a money decree against a Hindu co-parcener, and it was apparently not argued before the learned Judges that a vendee of a purchaser from a Hindu co-parcener could not claim against his vendor any such equity, as was mentioned in Manjayya v. Shunmuga (1913) I.L.R, 38 Mad. 684. The case was argued on the basis that in the case of a purchaser at Court auction there is no warranty of title. We do not see much significance in the fact that the question now raised before us was not raised before the learned Judges who decided Sabapathi Pillai v. Thandavaraya Odayar (1919) I.L.R. 43 Mad. 309. We are of opinion that if we were to hold that the plaintiff is entitled to whatever land the first defendant might have got in substitution for what he had purchased from his vendor we would be giving him property which he never bargained for. We therefore set aside the decree of the District Judge and give the plaintiff in its stead a decree for damages which he had asked for in the plaint as an alternative remedy. He claimed Rs. 300 as damages and we think he is entitled to it. The learned District Judge is evidently wrong in saying that in assessing damages the plaintiff is not entitled to ask that they should be assessed at the present enhanced value of the land. Surely he is entitled to full compensation so that he might be restored pecuniarily to the same position as if he had recovered the land which the first defendant sold to him. We also direct that si