1920 Supreme(Mad) 215
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MARAS
S Ayyar, Napier
Muthiyala Chengappa
Versus
Buradagunta Alias Akula
Decided On : 30 July, 1920
The main legal point established in the judgment is that acceleration of the reversioner's right by transactions between joint female heirs cannot be contrived without the knowledge or consent of the reversioner.
Headnote:
Acceleration of Reversioner's Right - Property Rights - Limitation Act, Article 141 - Summary: The court discussed the acceleration of the right of a male reversioner by transactions between joint female heirs and concluded that such acceleration cannot be contrived without the knowledge or consent of the reversioner. The court also highlighted the limitations of agreements that may accelerate the succession of the reversioner and emphasized the need for clear authorities and precedents to extend such anomalies.
Fact of the Case:
The plaintiff, as the purchaser from the reversioner to the estate of Gurappa, brought a suit after the deaths of the widows to claim the estate. The District Judge dismissed the suit on the ground of limitation.
Finding of the Court:
The court set aside the judgment of the District Judge based on the sole ground of limitation and remanded the appeal for disposal on other questions arising in the case.
Issues: The main issue was the acceleration of the reversioner's right and the applicability of the Limitation Act.
Ratio Decidendi: The court emphasized that acceleration of the reversioner's right by transactions between joint female heirs cannot be contrived without the knowledge or consent of the reversioner.
Final Decision: The judgment of the District Judge was set aside, and the appeal was remanded for disposal on other questions.
Sadasiva Ayyar, J.
1. The plaintiff is the appellant in this Second Appeal. He is the purchaser from the reversioner to the estate of one Gurappa. Gurappa died in 1883, leaving two widows as his heirs. The younger widow on receipt of rupees thirty gave up all her rights (about six months after her husbands death) in favour of the elder widow under the deed, Exhibit E. I agree with the Lower Appellate Court on the construction of Exhibit E, that she thereby gave up her whole life-interest in her husbands estate, whether that interest might have extended beyond the lifetime of the elder widow or whether it would have come to an end during the lifetime of the elder widow. The elder widow died in 1902 and the younger widow in 1914, and the present suit was brought by the purchaser from the male reversioner in 1916. The learned District Judge dismissed the suit on the preliminary ground of limitation. His argument was, that by the junior widow giving up her right of survivorship (if she happened to survive the senior widow), the senior widow not only represented the whole widows estate during her own lifetime, but that on her death, the fact that the junior widow was still living was no obstacle to prevent the reversioners from coming in, the junior widows relinquishment having accelerated the succession of the male reversioner, and as such acceleration took place in 1902 and the suit was brought in 1916, the plaintiff was barred under Article 144 of the Limitation Act.
2. It was argued before us, in the first place, by the Appellants learned vakil that the senior widow on her death owned a sort of stridhanam in her husbands property which was inherited by her own heirs, that the junior widow was the heir to that stridhanam estate (which however lasted only till the junior widow died in 1914), and that the reversioner became entitled to inherit the whole of the husbands estate only afterwards; and reliance was placed on Pappammal v. Venkatasami Naiker S.A. No. 356 of 1918 (unreported.). As this question of the right of a widow who had parted with her rights to her co-widow to inherit the right again on the death of the co-widow is said to be under consideration before another Bench of this Court, and as I feel doubts as to an estate surrendered by a widow to a co-widow constituting in some sense or to any extent the property of the surrenderee held by her in a different capacity from that of the widow of her husband. I shall not deal with this question further in this case, it not being necessary for the purpose of deciding this Second Appeal to express a final opinion on that question.
3. The next point is whether there was this acceleration of the right of the male reversioner on the death of the elder widow. Acceleration by surrender to the next male reversioner (which I take it, means a surrender known to and accepted by him) is, no doubt, known to the law.
4. Acceleration caused by the statute law declaring that a widow contracting second marriage shall be deemed to have died can also be understood: but acceleration of the right of a male reversioner by transactions between two or more joint female heirs cannot in my opinion be contrived by them without the knowledge or consent of the reversioner. Article 141 of the Limitation Act, though it uses the words female in the singular clearly covers a case where the Hindu reversioner is entitled to the property on the deaths of more than one female heir inheriting jointly. And when the last column speaks of when the female dies it clearly means in such a case after the deaths of all the female co-heirs. That a male reversioners right should be accelerated by agreements to which he is not a party is to me a very startling proposition, and even though there may be more startling propositions and anomalous rules in the modern Hindu Law, I do not see why I should extend such anomalies unless I am bound by clear authorities and precedents to do so. Mr. Govindaraghava Ayyar relied upo