1. The contention of the appellant in this case is that he enjoyed a right of way over the first respondents land peaceably and without interruption for a period of twenty years. But it is found that for four years before the institution of the suit the plaintiff did not enjoy any such right of way being effectively prevented from doing so by the first respondent. Those being the facts, the learned Judge held that the plaintiffs suit failed by virtue of the provision of Section 15 of the Easements Act that "each of the said periods of twenty years shall be taken to be a period ending within the two years before the institution of the suit wherein the claim to which such period relates is contested." The argument on behalf of the appellant is that since the appellant had enjoyed for a period of twenty years the right claimed by him peaceably, openly and without interruption, it made no difference that for four years before the institution of the suit he was prevented from using the pathway inasmuch as he never submitted to it but protested against such obstruction. He relies on explanation (2) to Section 15 which lays down that "nothing is an interruption within the meaning