The main legal point established in the judgment is that a lessor, having transferred the lease, is not entitled to claim mesne profits against a trespasser, as the rights to possession and mesne profits belong to the lessee.

John Wallis, C.J.

1. The plaintiff in this case on 6th December 1917 took the suit lands and other lands on lease from the first defendant under a rental agreement (Exhibit A) for four years from 15th December 1917 at an annual rent of Rs. 400 and on the same day Venkatachalla and Ponnusami Muthiriyan took the same lands from the plaintiff for the same term and at the same rent, under Exhibit V, which is styled a deed of sublease and contains a stipulation that they would themselves take possession of the lands and enjoy them. The plaintiff did not obtain possession of the suit lands and brought this suit to recover possession and mesne profits of them from his lessor the first defendant and defendants 2 to 4 who were alleged to be in wrongful possession of them. The Subordinate Judge found that defendants 2 to 4 were in possession of the suit lands as trespassers, and passed a decree for possession against all the defendants, and for Rs. 350 for past mesne profits and Rs. 549 for proportionate costs against the second defendant and directed an inquiry as to future mesne profits from the date of suit until payment. There was a like decree against the third and fourth defendants in respect of the lands in their occupation. The second defendant has alone appealed. On the question of fact we see no reason to differ from the finding of the Subordinate Judge that the possession of the second defendant was that of a trespasser. The lands in question had been leased for three years not to him but to his brother-in-law, and his case in his written statement that he paid Rs. 200 to the first defendant who promised to execute a registered lease in his favour for another two years has not been proved. As the Subordinate Judge has pointed out, there is a variance between his written statement and his evidence, which was that he obtained the lands in the first instance under an oral lease for five years. This evidence the Subordinate Judge has disbelieved and we see no reason to differ from him.

2. There remains, however, the important question whether the plaintiff is entitled to mesne profits against the second defendant in spite of the fact that he had transferred the whole of his term to Venkatachalla and Ponnuswami under Exhibit V. It is opposed to general principles to allow one person to sue for what belongs to another, or for damages sustained by another, and any departure from this principle would in my opinion be sure to lead to undesirable complications. Rules 78 and 79 in Diceys Parties to an Action, pages 324, 330 are as follows:

Rule 78.--No one can bring an action for any injury which is not an injury to himself.

Rule 79.--The person who sustains an injury is the person to bring an action for the injury against the wrongdoer.

3. This is the foundation of the English rule which was applied in Ramanadan Chetti v. Pulikutti Servai (1898) I.L.R., 21 Mad., 283, in Krishna Nambudri v. The Secretary of State (1909) 19 M.L.J., 347, and in earlier cases in India, that a lessor is not entitled to sue a trespasser for possession and mesne profits for the period during which the tenants term is outstanding. That this rule applies equally to India was shown by Sir John Edge, C.J. in Sita Ram v. Ram Lal (1896) I.L.R., 18 All., 440 (F.B.), 448, with the concurrence of four Judges of that Court The principle, it appears to me, must be the same all the world over, and certainly must be the same in India as in England, That principle is that where a man, whether the owner or merely a tenant, creates a tenancy under him which entitles the tenant to the exclusive use of the land or of the house, as it may be, the man creating the tenancy cannot have any right to actual possession, unless he has by the lease or by agreement with his tenant reserved to himself a right to re-enter and take possession. He has of course a right by due process of law if the facts arise, to have the tenancy created by him determined and his tenant ejected; but so l