Coutts Trotter, J.

1. The judgment I am about to pronounce is that of myself and my brother Ayling. The sole question we have to decide is what is the true construction of Section 89 of the Probate and Administration Act of 1881. Mr. Hakim at one time tried to argue that Act XII of 1855 must be deemed not only to give a fresh cause of action for and against representatives of those who had committed or suffered civil wrongs, but also by necessary implication to have prohibited the abatement of suits commenced by the wronged against the wrong-doer during the lifetime of both by reason of the death of either party. It may have been an omission of the legislature, but a close scrutiny of the text makes it reasonably clear that no provision was made in that enactment for the case of a suit already pending when one of the parties dies. We are thus left to the construction of Section 89 of the Act of 1881 which runs as follows:

All demands whatsoever, and all rights to prosecute or defend any suit or any other proceeding, existing in favour of or against a person at the time of his decease, survive to and against his executors or administrators, except causes of action for defamati