The main legal point established in the judgment is that a suit for rent under the Madras Estates Land Act is not of a nature cognizable by Small Cause Courts, as per the interpretation of Section 102 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Small Cause Courts Act II of 1887.

Sadasiva Aiyar, J.

1. A preliminary objection has been raised in this case, namely, that no second appeal lies having regard to Section 102 of the Code of Civil Procedure. To understand this objection, I shall state these material facts. The plaintiff who is the appellant before us is the proprietor of Tarla Estate and a landholder under the Madras Estates Land Act. The defendant is the holder of about 2 acres of wet land called " Kheta Jeroyati Kotwal land " in some place in some of the Muchilikas Exhibits A and B series but it is treated as jeroyati or ordinary ryoti land in fixing and charging assessment thereon. That it has been treated as ordinary jeroyati land from about 1906 by both the Zemindar and by the defendants father who was then a tenant cannot be denied. The proprietor seems to have made a reference to the land as " Kheta Kotwal, " that is, as once having been held on service tenure with some object which it is not necessary to find out definitely for the purpose of this case. As I said, the fact that the land had been converted into ryoti land with the consent and knowledge of both the landlord and tenant cannot in my opinion be disputed on the evidence. The present suit was brought by the plaintiff for the recovery of arrears of rent for four faslies preceding the institution of the suit. The defence was that the land continued to be service inam and that no rent was payable. The preliminary objection is to the effect that as this suit for rent is in the words of Section 102, C.P.C. a, suit of the nature cognisable by courts of small causes and as, the amount or value of the subject-matter is less than Rs. 500, no second appeal lies though the suit was instituted in the Revenue Court and though by Section 189 (Madras Estates Land Act), suits for rent brought by landholders under that Land Act against their tenants are expressly excluded from the jurisdiction of civil courts, (which expression includes small cause courts and civil courts exercising small cause jurisdiction). To find out whether a suit for rent between a landlord and a ryot falling under the Madras Estates Land Act is or is not of a nature cognisable by Small Cause Courts, we have to consider the provisions of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act II of 1887, Section 15 of that Act is as follows:

(1) A court of Small Causes shall not take cognisance of the suits specified in the second schedule as suits excepted from the cognisance of a Court of Small Causes.

(2) Subject to the exceptions specified in that schedule and to the provisions of any enactment for the time being in force all suits of a civil nature of which the value does not exceed Rs. 500/- shall be cognisable by a Court of Small Causes.

(3) Subject as aforesaid, the local government may by order in writing direct that all suits of a civil nature of which the value does not exceed Rs. 1000 shall be cognisable by a Court of Small Causes mentioned in the order.

2. Clause 2 of Section 15 is the important clause in that section and in my opinion it shows that where any of the exceptions specified in the schedule to the act or any provision of any other enactment for the time being in force excludes the subject-matter of a suit from the cognisance of the Court of Small Causes then a suit relating to that subject-matter is not one of a nature cognisable by the Small Cause Court within the meaning of Section 102, of the Civil Procedure Code. Now if we turn to schedule II of the Small Cause Courts Act, clause S and Clause 44 of that schedule clearly exclude a suit of which the subject-matter is rent due to a landlord under the Estates Land Act by his tenant from the category of suits of a nature cognisable by the Small Cause Courts. The observations of the learned Chief Justice and of the majority of the other Judges in the Full Bench decision in Soundaram Aiyar v. Sennia Naicken (1990) I.L.R. 23 Mad. 547 : 10 M.L.J.329 (F.B) in my opinion support the above interpretation of Section 102,