A trustee's authority to appoint an agent does not extend to matters requiring judicial discretion, such as the dismissal of hereditary temple servants.

Sadasiva Aiyar, J.

1. These are two connected Second Appeals from the same judgment pronounced by the Subordinate Judge, Vellore as the Lower Appellate Court. In one of these second appeals, the appellant is the fifth defendant, and in the other, the appellants are the defendants Nos. 1 and 2. The facts of the case shortly stated are these. The plaintiff is the hereditary trustee of a temple called the Kasivis-vanatha Swami Temple situated in a village included in his Ami Jaghir. The 4th defendant is the hereditary archaka (temple priest) in the said temple and along with the hereditary office has inherited the right of enjoying the emoluments of certain manyam lands attached to the archaka service. In the year 1894 the elder brother of the 4th defendant who is the father of the 5th defendant and who was then the hereditary archaka granted a permanent lease of the plaint lands in favour of the father of defendants Nos. 1 to 3. The plaintiff executed a power of attorney, Exhibit D, in January 1915 in favour of one K.V. Lakshmana Rao, appointing him as (what the document describes as the) Commissioner and Agent to do several acts, functions and duties and to exercise several powers. One of such duties and powers which are granted under this deed Exhibit D is described in paragraph 9 as follows: " He", (i. e. the said Commissioner) " is authorised to appoint, dismiss, suspend or fine all Devastanam servants of my Jaghire and hold enquiries with regard to Devastanam and Service Inams of my Jaghire and take necessary steps for the proper management of the said Devastanam". Purporting to act under this clause, Mr, Lakshmana Rao enquired into the conduct of the defendants Nos. 4 and 5 (the fifth defendant was a minor at that time) and dismissed them from their office, of archakas on the 30th July 1915. This suit is brought (basing that dismissal as the cause of action) for the recovery of the lands from all the defendants, and also for a declaration tha the lands belong to the suit temple. Defendants Nos. 1 to 3 (whose father obtained the permanent cowle) went so far as to deny that the lands were temple lands and raised several other defences which it is unnecessary to set out in detail. Defendants Nos. 4 and 5 pleaded that it was only the melwaram of the lands that belonged to the suit temple and was granted as service manyam and that their dismissal by Mr. Lakshmana Rao was invalid, they being hereditary archakas who were not guilty of any such misconduct as could justify their dismissal. They seem also to have raised at the time of the framing of the issues the contention that the proceedings of Mr. Lakshmana Rao dismissing them were not legally valid because the delegation of the right of enquiry into the misconduct of hereditary archakas by the plaintiff to Mr. Lakshmana Rao was legally not justifiable. (Several other pleas were also raised which, again, it is unnecessary to set out).

2. The first issue raised in the case was whether the plaintiff can sue on behalf of the plaint mentioned temple. The District Munsif subdivided this issue into three, viz., (1) whether there was sufficient ground for the dismissal (that is of the defendants Nos. 4 and 5): (2) whether the defendants Nos. 4 and 5 could be legally dismissed and (3) whether the Commissioner was competent to dismiss in the place of the Jaghirdar. 1 think the question No. 3 should be answered in favour of the contention of the defendants Nos. 4 and 5 because, a trustee Cannot appoint an Agent to do acts in which judicial discretion was intended to be exercised by himself (the trustee). The? power of appointing an Agent exists in a trustee only as regards matters in which expert knowledge is required or in which it is usual (according to the course of the business) to employ Agents in respect of particular acts or where it is a matter of necessity (using the word " necessity in a business sense) to do so (and similar exceptional circumstances). The power of appoin