1921 Supreme(Mad) 5
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MARAS
J Wallis
Muthu Gowndan
Versus
Perumal Iyen
Decided On : 7 January, 1921
The main legal point established in the judgment is that there is no presumption that an inam grant is a grant of the melvaram only, and the burden of proof lies on the tenants to establish occupancy rights.
Headnote:
Presumption of Grant - Inam Grants - Suryanarayana v. Pattanna (1918) I.L.R. 41 Mad. 1012, Venkatasastrulu v. Sitaramudu (1919) I.L.R. 43 Mad. 166 - Section 3(2)(d) of the Estates Land Act - The judgments in the referenced cases established that there is no presumption that an inam grant is a grant of the melvaram only. The Privy Council held that the grant of an inam is presumed to be of both the melvaram and the kudivaram, and the burden of proof lies on the tenants to establish occupancy rights.
Fact of the Case:
The court considered the effect of the decisions of the Privy Council in Suryanarayana v. Pattanna and Venkatasastrulu v. Sitaramudu on the presumption of grant in inam cases.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that there is no presumption that an inam grant is a grant of the melvaram only, and the burden of proof lies on the tenants to establish occupancy rights.
Issues: The issue was whether there is a presumption of law as to the extent of the grant deducible from the rulings of the Privy Council in the referenced cases.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that there is no presumption that an inam grant is a grant of the melvaram only, and the burden of proof lies on the tenants to establish occupancy rights.
Final Decision: The court concluded that the judgments in the referenced cases established that there is no presumption that an inam grant is a grant of the melvaram only, and the burden of proof lies on the tenants to establish occupancy rights.
John Wallis, C.J.
1. The judgments in Nandigam Subbarayudu v. Kannam Saheb (1919) M.W.N.
836. and Sri Cadadhardoss Bavaji v. Suryanurayana Patnaik (1919) 338 M.L.J. 42, (to which I was a party) and in C.R.P. No. 610 of 1917 proceeded upon the view, which I think was not then seriously contested, that the effect of the decisions of the Privy Council in Suryanarayana v. Pattanna (1918) I.L.R. 41 Mad. 1012 and in Venkata Sastrulu v. Sitaramudu (1919) I.L.R. 43 Mad, 166 was to raise a presumption that a grant to an inamdar was a grant of the proprietary interest in the land including both warams. This view was seriously challenged for the first time in A.S. No. 160 of 1919 and 69 of 1918 before Abdur Rahim and Moore, JJ. who held that the effect of the Privy Council decisions was that in the case of a grant to an inamadar there was no presumption one way or the other as to whether there was a grant of the proprietary interest in the land. This reference raises the question which of these two views is correct. Now the first thing to be observed is that in the two cases mentioned in the order of reference all that the Privy Council was called upon to decide was whether the lands in question were proved to be an estate within the meaning of Clause (d) sub-Secction (2) of Section 3 of the Madras Estates Land Act, as " a village of which the land revenue alone has been granted to a person not owning the kudivaram thereof." Clearly the party claiming that any land is an estate within the meaning of this definition has the onus thrown on him of showing that the land revenue thereof alone has been granted to a person not owning the kudivaram. If there be a presumption that an inam grant is a grant of the revenue only, he would of course be entitled to take advantage of it. The question whether there was such a presumption was an open one when the Act was passed. The earliest cases in which the question of occupancy right came before the High Court were cases of villages granted in inam to temples in Tanjore, and in all these cases it was held that the temple was the owner of the land and that there was a presumption against the existence of any occupancy right on the part of the tenants: Alagaiya Tiruchittambala v. Saminada Pillai (1863) 1 M.H.C.R. 264 Subupalayi Ammal v. Appakutti Aiyyangar (1866) 3 M.H.C.R. 106. Ghokkalinga Pillai v. Vythilinga Pandara Sannady (1870) 6 M.H.C.R. 164. Krishnaswami v. Varadaraja (1880) I.L.R. 5 Mad, 345. Thiagaraja v. Canesam Banathu and Subramanya v. Ganesam Banthu (1883) I.L.R.7 Mad.374 Ghidambara Pillai v. Thiruvengadathiengar (1896) 7 M.L.J. 1. Chokkalingam Pillai v Mayandl Chettiar (1896) I.L.R.19 Mad. 485. Mayandi Chettiar v. Ghokkalingam Pillai (1904) I.L.R. 27 Mad.291. (P.C.) Then came the leading cases in Appa Row v. Subbanna (1880) I.L.R. 13 Mad. 60. Venkatanarsimha Naidu v. Dandamudi Kotayya (1897) I.L.R.20 Mad. 299. Chekati Zemindar v. Ranasooru Dhora (1899) I.L.R. 23 Mad. 318. establishing a presumption of occupancy right in Zemindaries and other larger estates. There was some hesitation about extending the same presumption to inams; but after.the passing of the Madras Estates Land Act 1908, there were a series of decisions holding that there was a presumption that inam grants were grants of land revenue only which was sufficient to make the inam an estate within the meaning of the definition and so confer or confirm occupancy rights in the tenants. When the Privy Council in Suryanarayana v. Paltana (1918) I.L.R. 41 Mad. 1012 overruled these decisions and decided that there was no such presumption, the immediate result, as regards the question which they were considering, was, that the definition of "estate " had to be applied without the aid of such a presumption; and that, any person asserting that the land was an estate had to prove that the grant was of the land revenue only to a person not owning the kudivaram, and that, if he could not establish this affirmatively, he must fail. Th