The main legal point established in the judgment is that an Official Receiver's application to treat the property as vested in him does not fall under the claim chapters of the Civil Procedure Code and is not time-barred under the Limitation Act.

Sadasiva Aiyar, J.

1. The first question in this case is whether an application by an Official Receiver to a court which had attached the property of an insolvent at the instance of a creditor, praying that the property may be treated as property vested in the Official Receiver and as therefore not available to the attaching creditor to satisfy exclusively his claim under the decree, whether such an application is a claim petition which falls within the class of claims and objections dealt with by Order 21, Rule 58 to 63, and under Order 38 Rule 8 (Claim preferred to property attached before judgment) or is an application sui juris not governed by those sections. In the case before us, the property was attached before judgment and the adjudicationvas after the attachment. It has now been settled in this Court by the Full Bench decision in Prasada Nayudu v. Virayya (1918) I.L.R. 41 Mad. 849 overruling the decision in Ramanamma v. Kamaraju (1917) I.L.R. 41 Mad. 23, that, notwithstanding the very vague and wideterms of Order 38, Rule 8 and notwithstanding that Order 21, Rule 63 has not been expressly extended to orders made on claim petitions perferred to properties attached before judgment, all the provisions of Order 21, Rules 58 to 63 (old Sections 278 to 283) must be held to have been impliedly incorporated in the rules in Order 38 relating to attachment before judgment. If therefore the claim by the Offieia) Receiver, in whom the insolvents property has become vested after the attachment, does not fall within the class of claims governed by Order 21. Rules 58 to 63, it may be taken that it is not also a claim falling to be dealt with under Order 38, Rule 8 where the attachment was before judgment.

2. If the property has vested in the official Receiver before the attachment, I have no doubt that the claim made by him for the release of that property falls within Order 21, Rule 58, but if the adjudication is after the attachment, he cannot attack the attachment itself as having been invalid or improper on the date when it was affected. All that he could do is to contend on the strength of Section 34 Clause I of Act 3 of 1907 (Section 51 of the Provincial Insolvency Act of 1920) and Section 16, Clause 2(a) of Act 3 of 1907 that the decree holders right to proceed in execution against the attached property had come to an end on the date of the order of adjudication with effect from which date the property vests in the Official Receiver. As stated in Govinda Das v. Karan Singh (1917) I.L.R. 40 All. 197 "Upon the adjudication in insolvency, the attachment ceased to have any effect. All the property of the insolvent vested in the Receiver." Order 21, Rule 58 applies to a claim made on the ground that the property is not liable to attachment. Order 21, Rule 59 says: "The claimant must adduce evidence to show that at the date of the attachment he had some interest in, or was possessed of, the property attached." Order 21, Rule 60 says that " Where the court is satisfied that the property was not, when attached, in the possession of the judgment-debtor etc. the court shall make an order releasing the property etc." Order 21, Rule 61 says: "Where the court is satisfied that the property was, at the time it was attached, in the possession of the judgment-debtor etc., it shall disallow the claim." Then Order 21, Rule 63, is enacted making it necessary that a suit by the unsucessful party has to be brought to nullify the order passed on a claim to which the previous rules apply as that order is conclusive subject to the result of the suit. We have then Article 11 of the Limitation Act which prescribes a period of one year for the suit contemplated in Order 21 Rule 63.

3. The Official Receiver in whom the property vested only after attachment cannot make a claim on the ground that the property was not liable to attachment-on the date it was attached. He cannot adduce evidence to show, that at the date of the attachment, he had an inte