The main legal point established in the judgment is that the application for alimony under Section 37 of the Indian Divorce Act should be made within a reasonable time after the decree for dissolution of marriage.

1. This is an appeal from a judgment of Mr-Justice Kumaraswami Sastri granting the petitioner, the divorced wife ot the respondent, alimony at the rate of Rs. 150 a month. The decree absolute was made on the 15th August 1905. The present application is made under Section 37 of the Indian Divorce Act which empowers the court on confirmation of any decree declaring a marriage to be dissolved to make an order for the payment of alimony. That section corresponded to Section 32 of the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1855 which has now been replaced by Section I(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1907. Both these Acts also contain similar language authorising an order of alimony to be made on any decree for dissolution or nullity of marriage. Now, much learned argument was addressed to us as to the meaning to be put upon the words "on confirmation". It was objected for the appellant that an order made 15 years after the decree for divorce had been made absolute could not possibly be regarded as made on confirmation of the decree. It is unnecessary to do more than to say that the Aprili number of 1921, Probate Division, Page 107, has brought out a decision, Scott v. Scott (1921) P. 107 on this very question. In that case an order for payment of alimony pendente lite had been made which of course ceased to operate on the making of the decree absolute. Payments had been continued for some time under some alleged agreement and seven years after, an application was made to the court under what is now the corresponding section of the Act of 1907. The learned President, Sir Henry Duke conceived that he had a discretion which enabled him to make the order but that decision was overruled by the Court of Appeal in judgments which are equally applicable to the facts of the present case. Lord Sterndale said, "The first question is, what is the meaning of on any decree for dissolution? I was inclined at one time to think that it meant at the same time as the decree was made, or as it could not precede it, at any rate immediately following upon it. Looking however at the decision of Sir James Hannen in Bradley v. Bradley (1878) 3 P.D. 47 and Sidney v. Sidney (1867) 36 L.J. (P & M) 733 in the House of Lords which he follows, and also Rcfbertson v. Robertson (1883) 8 P.D. 94, it seems to me that what Sir James Hannen calls a more elastic meaning must be given to the word "on " and that it does not mean " on " in the very narrow sense that I first thought it ought to be taken to mean, but that it must at any rate be limited to this extent - namely, it must be at the same time as the decree or within a reasonable time afterwards and that what constitutes a reasonable time must no doubt depend on all the circumstances of the case. It appears to me that the learned President has not quite taken that view. He has, I think, taken it as meaning at the same time as or immediately after or within such time as the judge in his discretion may think the petition may be presented. That in my opinion is too wide. What constitutes "a reasonable time" is, I know, not very easy to define ; but we have some guide, although I do not think it does lay down an absolute hard and fast rule, in what was said by Jessel M.R. in Robertson v. Robertson (1883) 8 P.D. 94. He said: "In the first place, it appears that there is no instance of an application of this nature being made at so late a period as the present application. Whatever meaning may be given to the word on in the Act of Parliament, it is very difficult to extend it to above a year. It is not necessary to express an opinion as to what time should be allowed, but it is not to be conceived that a period of more than a year can be included in the word on. On if not confined to the time of making the decree must mean shortly after." In that case the time was eighteen months, but as the decision of the court went in agreement with that of the learned president on the merits of the application and not really on the