1921 Supreme(Mad) 139
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MARAS
S Aiyar, Spencer
Jagna Sanyasiah
Versus
Mycherla Peda Atchanna Naidu
Decided On : 20 April, 1921
The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of the terms of a mortgage bond and its impact on the limitation period for filing a suit.
Headnote:
Limitation - Mortgage - Exhibit A - Article 132 of the Limitation Act - The court discussed the construction of Exhibit A and held that the suit on the bond of 1886 is barred by limitation. The court interpreted the terms of the document and concluded that the amount due under Exhibit A became due at the time of its execution in 1886, thus making the suit barred by limitation.
Fact of the Case:
The case involved a dispute regarding the limitation period for a suit on a mortgage bond (Exhibit A) from 1886. The main issue was whether the plaintiff's suit on the bond was barred by limitation.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the suit on the bond of 1886 was barred by limitation as the amount due under Exhibit A became due at the time of its execution in 1886.
Issues: The main issue was whether the plaintiff's suit on the bond was barred by limitation, and the court's finding was based on the interpretation of the terms of the document.
Ratio Decidendi: The court interpreted the terms of the mortgage bond (Exhibit A) and concluded that the amount due became payable at the time of its execution in 1886, leading to the suit being barred by limitation.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the suit on the bond of 1886, reversing the decree of the lower court, and awarded costs to the appellants.
Sadasiva Aiyar, J.
1. Defendants Nos. 3, 4, 13 and 14 are the appellants. The facts are somewhat complicated and in setting them out I shall, for the sake of brevity, describe the parties to old transactions, who are the ancestors of some of the parties to the, suit as if they were themselves parties to the suit. There was, first, a usufructuary mortgage of items Nos. 1 to 8 by defendants Nos. 1 and 2 to the plaintiff. Next, there were five usufructuary mortgages under Exhibits I to V executed in the years between 1880 and 1883 in favour of Srinodhu Appadu of items Nos. 9 to 16, the total sum due under these five usufructuary mortgages being Rs. 3,2000. Next, there was a simple mortgage (Exhibit A) in January 1886 for Rs. 6,000 made up of three items: (1) Rs. 3010 due under a simple debt bond of 1879 (Exhibit A-3); (2) Rs. 590 due under a promissory-note, and (3) Rs. 400 paid in case. It is on this last bond (Exhibit A) that the present suit for sale of the plaint properties, items Nos. 1 to 16, is brought.
2. The equity of redemption in half of items Nos. 1 to 8 is now vested in the 13th defendant and the equity of redemption in the other half in the 14th defendant, while the equity of redemption in items Nos. 9 to 16 invested in defendants Nos. 3 and 4 at the result of transactions which it is unnecessary to set out in detail.
3. The important and preliminary question in the case is whether the plaintiffs suit on this bond of 1886 is barred by limitation. One more fact might be stated, namely, that in 1915 defendants Nos. 3 and 4, in whom the equity of redemption in items Nos. 9 to 16 was vested paid Rs. 3,200 to the usufructuary mortgages of 1880 to 18.S3 (Exhibits I to V), The plaintiffs contention is that the date when the money became due to him under the simple mortgage-deed Exhibit A sued on is the date of, the redemption of items Nos. 9 to 16 from the ususfructuary mortgagee (i.e., 1915) and hence this suit is not barred. It is admitted that if his cause of action arose in 1886 itsel the suit would be barred as there are no acknowledgments of indebtedness after the year 1890, and as, admittedly, Article 132 of the limitation Act applies. Hence the question for decision is, what is the date 6n which the amount is borrowed under Exhibit A became due according to the proper construction of its terms. Those terms are to the following effect: "We shall discharge the principal and interest of this document on the security of the 13 garces of land" (that is items Nos. 1 to 8) "usufructually mortgaged under the document of 1879 and also of the 15 graces of land usufructually mortgaged to Srinodhu Appadu" under (Exhibits I to V) i.e., the lands mortgaged as the second set, namely, items Nos. 9 to 16 to be security after discharging the debt due to Srinodhu Appadu and we shall pay up the hypothecation debt on the securities above set out and get back the hypothecation bond." That according to me is the effect of the language used in, Exhibit A the construction of which it may be conceded owing to its involved grammatical construction is not free from obscurity. The lower Court accepted the plaintiffs contention and held that the parties intended that the amount due under Exhibit A was to become due only when, at some future uncertain date, the mortgagors or their representatives-in-interest chose to redeem Srinodhu Appadu and that as Srinodhu Appadu was redeemed only in 1915 it was then that the debt due under Exhibit A became due. After hearing full arguments I am unable to agree with the lower Court on the construction put by it upon Exhibit A. The provision about Srinodhu Appadus usufructuary mortgages which occurs in the position which describes the second set of properties, items Nos. 9 to 16, given as additional security was, I think, intended to embody merely the undertaking given by the mortgagors to discharge those usufructuary mortgage-deeds, Exhibits I to V, so as to make the properties better security and not