The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of the mortgage deed and the application of Section 132 of the Limitation Act to determine the limitation period for the suit.

Sadasiva Aiyar, J.

1. Defendants 3, 4, 13 and 14 are the appellants. The facts are somewhat complicated and in setting them out 1 shall for the sake of brevity describe the parties to old transactions who are the ancestors of some of the parties to the suit as if they were themselves parties to the suit. There was first a usufructuary mortgage of items 1 to 8 by defendants 1 and 2 to the plaintiff. Next there were five usufructuary mortgages under Ex. I to V executed in the years between 1880 and 1883 in favour of Srinadhu Appadu of items 9 to 16, the total sum due under these five usufructuary mortgages being Rs. 3,200. Next there was a simple mortgage (Ex. A) in January 1886 for Rs. 4,000 made up of three items :--(1) Rs. 3,010 due under a simple debt bond of 1879 (Ex. A-3,), (2) Rs. 590 due under a promissory note and (3) Rs. 400 paid in cash. It is on this bond Ex. A that the present suit for sale of the plaint properties items 1 to 16 is brought.

2. The equity of redemption in half, of items 1 to 8 is now vested in the 13th defendant and the equity of redemption in the other half in the 14th defendant while the equity of redemption in items 9 to 16 is vested in defendants 3 and 4 as a result of transactions which it is unnecessary to set out in detail.

3. The important and preliminary question in the case is whether the plaintiffs suit on this bond of 1886 is barred by limitation. One more fact ,might be stated, namely that in 1915 defendants 3 and 4 in whom the equity of redemption in items 9 to 16 was vested paid Rs. 3,200 to the usufructuary mortgagee Srinadhu Appadu and thus redeemed the usufructuary mortgages of 1880 to 1883 (Exs. I to V). The plaintiffs contention is that the date when the money became due to him under the simple mortgage deed Ex, A sued on is the date of the redemption of items 9 to 16 from the usufructuary mortgagee (i.e. 1915) and hence this suit is not barred. It is admitted that if his cause of action arose in 1886 itself the suit would be barred as there are no acknowledgments of indebtedness after the year 1890, and as admittedly article 132 of the Limitation Act applies. Hence the question for decision is what is the date on which the amount borrowed under Ex. A became due according to the proper construction of its terms. Those terms are to the following effect. "We shall discharge the principal and interest of these documents on the security of the 13 garces of land" (that is items 1 to 8) "usufructuarily mortgaged under the document of 1879) and also on the 15 garces of land usufructuarily mortgaged to Srinadhu Appadu" under Ex. I to V i. e. the lands mortgaged as the second set, namely items 9 to 16, to be security after discharging the debt due to Srinadhu Appadu) and we shall pay up the hypothecation debt on the securities above set out and get back this hypothecation bond." That according to me is the effect of the language used in Ex, A the construction of which it may be conceded, owing to its involved grammatical construction, is not free from obscurity. The lower court accepted the plaintiffs contention and held that the parties intended that the amount due under Ex. A was to become due only when at some future uncertain date, the mortgagors or their representatives in interest chose to redeem Srinadhu Appadu and that as Srinadhu Appadu was redeemed only in 1915, it was then that the debt due under Ex. A became due. After hearing full arguments I am unable to agree with the lower court on the construction put by it upon Ex. A, The provision about Srinadhu Appadus usufructuary mortgages which occurs in the portion which describes the second set of properties items 9 to 16 given as additional secrity was, I think, intended to embody merely the undertaking given by the mortgagors to discharge those usufructuary mortgage deeds Exs. I to V so as to make the properties better security and not to postpone the date from which the cause of action for the plaintiffs enforcement of his