A family Karar cannot restrict the right of a succeeding Karnavan to succeed to the full powers of a Karnavan in the natural course of events.

Sadasiva Aiyar, J.

1. The defendants Nos. 1 to 4 and 6 to 14 are the appellants before as. The 5th defendant died after the suit. Twenty more defendants were impleaded in the suit but they have not preferred any appeal. The appellants are thirteen of the members of a Tar wad which had four Tavazhies, One Eachara Menon was the Karnavan of the whole Tar wad till his death in January 1908, The plaintiff succeeded by Marummakkahayam law to the Karnavastanam at Eachara Menons death. A Karar had been executed during Eachara Menons lifetime on the 2nd September 1916 to which the said prior Karnavan and almost all the adult members of the Tar wad were parties. Only three persons was not parties to it, that is, those who are mentioned as Nos. 7, 16 and 20 in that Karar No. 7, afterwards confirmed the Karar by a separate deed and No. 20 in the Karar (who is the 25th defendant in the present suit) had given up the world before the date of the Karar and might be ignored. The appellants contention is that the plaintiff who was No. 16 in the Karar refused to sign it because at the last moment he wanted three further provisions to be inserted in the Karar in his favour and the other members of the Tar wad refused their consent. This is probably true. The fact, however, remains that he refused to be a party to the Karar as executed finally.

2. It was contended that the plaintiff had first agreed to all the terms of the Karar about a week before it was executed and then illegally refused to sign it at last. I think the evidence clearly establishes that it was intended that the mere understandings arrived at during the negotiations of the Karar should not have the force of a final agreement, and that the finality and binding nature of the agreement depended on agreement, the agreement being reduced to writing and signed by the persons intended to be bound thereby. The provision inserted in the Karar after the plaintiff refused to sign it, namely, that the plaintiff should be deprived of the benefits of maintenance given to him by the Karar till he executed a confirmation document also supports the above conclusion. The plaintiffs dishonesty in pretending ignorance of the negotiations before the execution of the Karar is irrelevant to the consideration of the question of the legally binding nature of the Karar on him.

3. The plaintiffs suit preys for the following reliefs:

(1) a declaration that the Karar is not binding on the plaintiff;

(2) that the properties described in schedule A in the possession of the 1st defendants Tavazhi should be surrendered to him;

(3) that certain moveable properties shown in schedule B be delivered to the plaintiff or their value be awarded to him on the personal liability of defendants NOS. 1 to 6 and on the Tavazhi of all the defendants to the extent of their Tavazhi, properties, and

(4) that the income of the properties in schedule A at the rate of 2000 Paras of paddy per year from 1094 (1918-19) be also awarded to the plaintiff (besides the other usual reliefs).

4. Defendants Nos. 1 to 14 alone contested the suit. On their pleas, several issues were framed of which it is necessary to set out only issues NOS. 1, 5, 7, 8, and 10, and they areas follows:

(1) Whether the plaint-mentioned Karar is a bona fide family arrangement, and whether the plaintiff withheld his signature wrongfully, or whether it was executed in the circumstances alleged in the plaint? Whether it is valid and binding upon the plaintiff?

(5) Whether the plaint Karar is entitled to be upheld as a maintenance arrangement for the defendants and whether the plaintiff is not entitled to recover the properties allotted for maintenance as contended by 1st defendant?

(7) Whether the rent of 1093 was partially discharged by payment to Eachara Menon as contended by 1st defendant?

(8) Is the plaintiff entitled to recover any and what rent for the plaint properties? Is the 1st defendant liable to be treated as a tenant? Is the letting alleged in the plaint tr