The importance of propinquity of blood in determining heirship under the Mitakshara law.

Ramesam, J.

1. The plaintiffs are the stepsons of the stepsister of the deceased and claim to succeed to his estate. Our learned brother Kumaraswami Sastri J. dismissed the suit, holding that plaintiffs are not heirs. The plaintiffs appeal. The only point for decision in appeal is whether the stepson of a stepsister is an heir under the Hindu Law (according to Mitakshara) as administered in the Madras Presidency.

2. Mr. A Krishnaswami Aiyar who appeared for the appellant started his case by saying (1) that the stepsister is a sapinda of the propositus and (2) that the plaintiffs are her sapindas. But he did not, and rightly,--follow up these propositions by arguing that the plaintiffs are therefore sapindas of the propositus. Later on, he expressly disclaimed any intention to argue that the plaintiffs are Bandhus (or Bhinnagotra sapindas) of the deceased. On this portion of the case, it is only sufficient to observe, that, in general, sapindaship involves descent from a common ancestor, the only exception to this principle being the case of wives of male sapindas. If A and B (males) are sapindas of each other, the wives of A and B are sapindas. This follows from the definition of sapinda in the Achara Adhyaya of the Mitakshara (quoted in Umaid Bahadur v. Udai Chand (1881) I.L.R. 6 Cal. 119 at 124 and 125 Babu Lal v. Nanku Ram (1894) I.L.R. 22 Cal. 339 at 344 Ramachandra Martand Waiker v. Vinayak Venkatesh Kothekar (1914) I.L.R. 42 Cal. 384 at p. 407, 410 (P.C.); Rajkumar Sarvadhikari on Inheritance pages 601-605; and West and Bulher 4th Edn. page 114). But the sapinda relationship of such females--except in the case of ancestors such as mother, grand mother etc., who come in among Sagotra heirs-has not served to bring them into the line of heirs; so that a stepmother, (Mari v. Chinnammal (1884) I.L.R. 8 Mad. 107, Seethai v. Nachiar (1912) I.L.R. 37 Mad. 286) or a great grandfathers great grandsons widow (Balamma v. Pullayya (1894) I.L.R. 18 Mad. 168) is not an heir under the Mitakshara Law; except in Bombay (Lalubhai Bapubhai v. Mankuvar Bhai and Ors. (1876) I.L.R. 2 Bom. 388 Rachava v. Kalingappa (1892) I.L.R. 16 Bom. 716, Kashibai v. Moreshur Raghunath (1911) I.L.R. 35 Bom. 389), generally there is no such principle of law as that--if A and B not descended from a common ancestor are each a sapinda of C, A and B are sapindas of each other.

3. The arguments of the appellant are two-fold. A step mother is regarded as the equivalent of a mother (Manu IX, 183; see also Vishnu XV, 41 and Vasishtta XVII, 11) for various purposes (a) adoption, (b) sharing with sons in partition, (c) inheritance to a womans sfridhan. In the first case, the principle is that adoption is to a father primarily and only in a secondary sense to his wife, so much so that, except in the case of Pratigrihita mata or the wife who is actually associated with the husband in the ceremony of adoption (Annapurni Nachiar v. Forbes (1899) I.L.R. 23 Mad. 1 (P.C.)) all the wives of an adopter are regarded as adoptive mothers. (See Mayne Section 167). In the second case, plural is used in the texts-wives in Mitakshara Ch. 1 Section 2 pl. 9 and mothers (matarau) in Smrithi Chandrika Ch. 4, Section 14 citing Vishnu and inferring that mother includes step-mother. In the third case, the right to succession to a womans stridhan of her stepson is based on special texts (e. g.) Viramitrodaya Ch. 5 part. II Section 5. Anyhow it is clear that the argument may be carried too far. In the text of Brihaspati (quoted in Smrithi Chandrika Ch. 9 Section 3 Section 36, Vyavahara Mayukka Ch. 4 S. .10 in Mandlik page 98 and Viramitrodaya Ch. 5 Part. II Section 14) certain other female relatives besides step-mother are regarded as mothers. It is clear that the general principle stated in Manu IX, 183 did not avail the step-mother to become an heir (Mari v. Chinnammal (1884) I.L.R. 8 Mad. 107, Seethai v. Nachier (1912) I.L.R. 37 Mad. 286) and cannot in general be relied on in question