The main legal point established in the judgment is that notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure is necessary in cases where the act of a public officer is 'intended to seem' to be done in his official capacity, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the public officer.

John Wallis, C.J.

1. As observed by Seshagiri Aiyar, J. in his order of reference the point for decision is whether in consequence of his want of bona fides the first defendant forfeited his right to notice before suit under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Both the referring Judges were of opinion that the act done by the defendant came within the words "any act purporting to be done by such public officer in his official capacity. "These words were introduced into Section 424 of the Code of 1877 by Act XII of 1879, and the corresponding Section 80 of the present Code was further amended by substituting "any" for " an " and ",such public officer" for "him". According to the concise Oxford Dictionary recently published at the Clarendon Press, to "purport" in this context means to "be intended to seem". There can be no doubt that the act of the Village Munsif in handing over the surplus proceeds of the revenue sale to the defaulting owner was an act "intended to seem" to be done by him in his official capacity so as to render notice of suit necessary, if effect is to be given to the language of the section according to the natural meaning of the words used, The legislature may well have considered it desirable to require notice of suit to be given in all such cases, and I see no reason for putting a restrictive construction upon the section. It is significant that the words " purporting to be done" are wider than " done or intended to be done under the provisions of this Act," in Section 264 of the Public Health Act, which appear to be the most comprehensive words used in any of the corresponding statutory provisions in England, seeing that they also include "acts intended to seem to be done in his official capacity;" and it is quite probable that they were chosen oh that very ground and for the purpose of making the English decisions inapplicable. As observed in Booth v. Clive (1851) 10 Com. Bench. 827 : 138 E.R 827 it is not very easy to reconcile all the observations that are to be found in the English cases, and they must be read with reference to the circumstances of each particular case. Further, the current of English decisions does not in my opinion support the view taken, in Shahebzadee Shahunshah Begum v. Fergusson (1881) I.L.R. 7 C. 499 that notice is only requisite in the case of inadvertent acts and cannot be required where there is a want of bona fides. On the contrary in Kirby v. Simpson (1854) 10 Ex. 358 it was expressly laid down by Parke, B., and the Court of Exchequer that "a person may act maliciously and yet act in the execution of his office as a justice of the peace," and that in such a case notice must be given to him. Similarly in Royal Aquarium and Summer and Winter Garden Society v. Parkinson (1892) 1 Q.B. 431 in the Court of appeal, where Kirby v. Simpson was cited for the appellants, it was not even contended on the other side that the finding of malice against the defendant disentitled him to notice if he was otherwise entitled to it. In the third and most authoritative edition of Bullen and Leakes Precedents of Pleadings, 1868, the learned authors sum up the effect of the decisions on the various English statutes at p. 759 as follows: "A person is entitled to notice of action as acting under or in pursuance of a statute or in execution of his office, where he bona fide believes in the existence of facts which, if existing, would justify his acting in pursuance of the statute or in execution of his office." In the present case there were facts justifying the Village Munsif in acting in his official capacity, and there was no occasion for him to resort to the defence that he bona fide, though erroneously, believed in the existence of such facts. In so far as Shahebzadee Shahunshah Begum v. Fergusson (1881) I.L.R. 7 C. 499 and the cases which follow it lay down that the section only applies to acts done inadvertently in the course of official duty, I am unable, with great respect, to