1918 Supreme(Mad) 173
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MARAS
A Rahim, S Aiyar
Venkata Reddi
Versus
Kuppa Reddi
Decided On : 25 April, 1918
The main legal point established in the judgment is the determination of property entitlement under Hindu Law, including the nature of property division, accountability, and the limitations on consent and limitation periods.
Headnote:
Partition - Hindu Law - 1906 Partition - Tenants-in-common - Extra share to managing member - Accountability - Limitation Act - Consent of mother not binding on plaintiffs - Reversal of Subordinate Judge's decree - Declaration of plaintiffs' entitlement to one-third of properties and fourth of extra share - Entitlement to account of income - Decree modification for specific items
Fact of the Case:
The case involved a dispute over the division of family properties following a 1906 partition among brothers. The plaintiffs, sons of the fourth brother, claimed a half share in the properties taken by the first and fourth brothers. The Subordinate Judge concluded that the A schedule properties should be shared equally by the two branches, based on their joint living and enjoyment of properties.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the 1906 partition resulted in the first and fourth branches becoming tenants-in-common of the A schedule properties, with the extra share given to the managing member. The court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to one-third of the properties and a fourth of the extra share, subject to limitation. The court also addressed specific items for decree modification.
Issues: The main issues included the status of the 1906 partition, the nature of property enjoyment, accountability, limitation, and the consent of the mother to the extra share for the managing member.
Ratio Decidendi: The court relied on Hindu Law principles to determine the nature of property division and the entitlement of the plaintiffs. It emphasized the need for proper documentation for property transactions and the limitations on consent by the mother. The court also considered the applicability of the Indian Limitation Act to the case.
Final Decision: The court reversed the Subordinate Judge's decree, declaring the plaintiffs' entitlement to one-third of the properties and a fourth of the extra share, and their right to an account of income. The decree was further modified for specific items in favor of the plaintiffs.
Seshagiri Aiyar, J.
1. One Kuppa Reddi had four sons. The eldest was Ramasami Reddi the father of defendants Nos. 1 to 3. He died in 1914. The last was one Muthu Reddi, who died fifteen years ago, and the plaintiffs are his sons. There were two other sons. In July 1906 there was a partition among the brothers evidenced by Exhibit IT. The family properties were divided into two schedules. Schedule B, was allotted to the second and to third brothers and schedule A was given to the first and the sons of the fourth brother. | These latter were represented by their mother as guardian. The document also says that as No. 1 out of us has been managing the affairs as the head of the family, one share in addition is included."
2. The present suit is for a half share in the properties which were taken by the first and the fourth brothers. The defendants case is that the plaintiffs are entitled only to a third share, and that the plaintiff can have no right to the eldest brothers extra share. The Subordinate Judge came to the conclusion that the A schedule properties, which fell to the first and fourth branches, should be shared equally by the two branches. He found that, since the partition, the two branches lived in commensality, kept no accounts and enjoyed the properties as if they were members of an undivided family. This conclusion on facts is not seriously disputed in appeal.
3. The real question argued before us was whether Exhibit U effected a division in status between the first and the fourth branches of the family, and whether since 1906 their properties were enjoyed by the two branches as tenants-in-common or as coparceners. There can be no question of re-union because, on the date of the partition, the plaintiffs were minors. That is now settled by the decision of the Judicial Committee in Ram Pershad Singh v. Lakhpati Koer 30 C.231 : 30 I.A. 1 : 7 C.W.N. 162 : 5 Bom. L.R. 103 : 8 Sar. P.C.J. 380 (P.C.), vide also Balabux v. Bukhmabai 30 C. 725 : 30 I.A. 130 : 7 C.W.N. 642 : 5 Bom. L.R. 469 : 8 Sar. P.C.J.470 (P.C.).
4. There are some outstanding facts which incline me to hold that the first and the fourth branches of the family became divided inter se. In the first place, if the object was to send away the second and the third branches, there was no necessity for the members of the fourth branch being represented by their mother as guardian. Under the Hindu Law although the mother may be the natural guardian as long as the family remains undivided, she has no right of respresentation in respect of the family property.
5. Another circumstance is that an extra share was in terms given to the eldest member who was the manager of the family. This, in my opinion, points to the fact that the properties were divided into five, shares, that each brother took a share and an extra share was given to the eldest member. The fact that Exhibit U does not say that the properties were "divided into five shares, does not, in my opinion, negative this view. The shares of the four brother? under the Hindu Law are well ascertained and the document speaks of an extra share. It can only mean that an additional fifth share was given to the managing member. This view of mine is strengthened by the oral evidence given in the case. Three of plaintiffs own witnesses speak to the properties having been divided into five Shares and one extra share having been given to the managing member. P. Ws. Nos. 3, 10 and 32 give definite evidence on this question. D.W. No. 1 says that the property was divided into five shares. D.W. No. o who is a paternal uncle of plaintiffs and of defendants says that there was a division into five shares and an extra share was given to the managing member. D.W. No. 7 also gives similar evidence. It may be said that D.W. No. 12 is an interested witness. Apart from his evidence, the evidence I have referred to, is so clear and consistent and fits in so well with the probabilities of the case that I am not prepared to reject