IN THE HIGH COURT OF MARAS
Sivaramalinga Dikshatar
Versus
Sabharathna Dikshitar
Decided On : 28 August, 1918
Specific Relief Act - Suit maintainability without prayer for joint possession - Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act
Fact of the Case:
The plaintiff, a Dikshitar, filed a suit seeking a declaration that a resolution directing him to deliver a plot of land to the temple and suspending him from his office was illegal. He also sought an injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with his office and claimed damages for loss of emoluments and reputation.
Finding of the Court:
The lower Courts held the suit to be not maintainable under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act without a prayer for joint possession of the temple and its properties. However, the High Court disagreed, stating that the plaintiff was not bound to ask for joint possession and that the dismissal of the suit for not asking for such relief was erroneous.
Issues: The main issue was whether the suit was maintainable without a prayer for joint possession under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act.
Ratio Decidendi: The Court held that a plaintiff is not bound to seek further relief which he has failed to claim unless it is quite clear that such relief should be sought. The further relief must flow directly from the declaration sought for and be claimable in an ordinary suit by virtue of the title sought to be declared.
Final Decision: The lower Courts' decree was set aside, and the suit was remanded to the first Court for disposal according to law. The defendants were ordered to pay the plaintiff's costs.
1. The Lower Courts have dismissed the plaintiffs suit without any trial holding that it was not maintainable under the Specific Relief Act without a prayer for the possession of the temple and its properties jointly with the defendants. Though a preliminary issue was framed on the point no evidence was given or taken and the question was disposed of solely on the pleadings; we have therefore to decide the question on the same materials.
2. In this plaint the plaintiff states that he is one of the Dikshitars, who are holders of the combined offices of archaka and dharmakartha in the plaint temple, and that as such he is entitled according to the usage of the temple to the right of performing puja for five days once in every 9 months and along with 19 others to the custody of the idols, jewels and other valuables of the temple for 6 months by rotation (apparently once in 6 or 7 years). He states that in 1909 on account of a dispute as to the ownership of a certain plot of land the body of Dikshitars passed a resolution directing him to deliver it up to the temple and inflicted a fine of Rs. 300 on him and suspended him from his office till he obeyed their orders. He complains that as a result of this resolution he has been obstructed in the exercise of the rights and duties of his office and prevented from enjoying the emoluments and privileges attached to it. He claims that the resolution is illegal and inoperative and prays for a declaration to that effect and also for an injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with him in the exercise of his office. He further claims damages for the loss of emoluments caused by the wrongful obstruction of the defendants and for the loss of his reputation, in all Rs. 1,600. The only objection the defendants took to the frame of the plaint in their written statement was that plaintiff should have asked for the possession of his office as well. Plaint was thereupon amended to add a prayer for the Joint possession of the office. The above is a brief summary of the material allegations and prayers in the plaint with reference to the point we have to consider.
3. On this plaint the lower Courts have held that as plaintiff was excluded by the defendants from the office of dharmakartha he ought to sue not only for a declaration that the defendants act was wrongful but also for the possession of the temple and its properties as consequential relief flowing from the declaration: and relying mainly on the observations of Subrahmania Aiyar, J., in Vengan Poosari v. Patchamuthu (1903) 14 M.L.J. 290, and on the rulings in Abdul Kadar v. Mahomed (1891) I.L.R. 15 Mad. 15, and Rathnasabapathi Pillai v. ramasami Aiyar (1910) I.L.R. 33 Mad. 452, and distinguishing the case in ramadoss v. Hanumantha Rao (1911) I.L.R. 36 Mad. 364 they have held the suit to be not maintainable under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act without such a prayer. On the facts of this case we are unable to support that view.
4. We agree with Mookerjee, J., in thinking that a Court should not throw out a suit on the ground that it is barred by the proviso to Section 42 unless it is quite clear that the plaintiff ought to seek further relief which he has failed to claim. See Aisa Siddika v. Bidhu Sekhar (1912) 17 C.L.J. 30, 33. The further relief the section speaks of is such relief as flows directly from the declaration sought for and such as a plaintiff will be able to claim in an ordinary suit by virtue of the title sought to be declared. This is the view taken in Abdul Kadar v. Mahomed (1891) I.L.R. 15 Mad. 15 and we accept it. Such further relief will necessarily depend on the facts of each case. Is it clear then that in the present case on the declaration asked for being granted the plaintiff will become thereby entitled to the joint possession of the temple and its properties and that he should be compelled to seek that relief and pay court fees on their value which is said to be about Rs. 35 lakhs. We do not
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