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1918 Supreme(Mad) 227

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MARAS
Lakshumanan Chetty
Versus
R.M.K.S. Sadayappa Chetty
Decided On : 15 August, 1918

A receiver may be considered an agent authorized to make an acknowledgment within the meaning of Section 19, Explanation II of the Limitation Act.

Headnote:

Limitation Act - Acknowledgment by Receiver - Section 19, Section 21 - The court held that a receiver may be an agent authorized to make an acknowledgment within the meaning of Section 19, Explanation II. The language is general enough to include an agent appointed either by statute or by Court, if he is authorized under the law to make acknowledgments.

Fact of the Case:

The suit involved a question of whether an acknowledgment of a debt due by the firm under dissolution made by the Receiver was valid.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the receiver may be an agent authorized to make an acknowledgment within the meaning of Section 19, Explanation II of the Limitation Act.

Issues: The main issue was whether the acknowledgment by the Receiver was valid under the Limitation Act.

Ratio Decidendi: The court analyzed the provisions of Section 19 and Section 21 of the Limitation Act and held that a receiver may be considered an agent authorized to make an acknowledgment within the meaning of Section 19, Explanation II.

Final Decision: The court accepted the finding that the acknowledgments by the receiver were acts necessary for the preservation of the estate and dismissed the appeals with costs.

JUDGMENT

1. The first defendant was a minor. There was a suit for dissolution of the firm, and in that suit a Receiver was appointed under order of the Rangoon Court in these terms,--" It is ordered that M.A.R.A.R. Ramanathan Chetty be, and he is hereby appointed Receiver to take charge of the property of the Chetty firms of M.L.R.M.A. and A.L.A.S.R.M. pending the decision of this suit for dissolution of partnership with power to collect out-standings and do all things necessary for the realization and preservation of the assets of the said firms." The question we have got to decide in the appeal is whether an acknowledgment of a debt due by the firm under dissolution made by the Receiver was valid.

2. It is contended that Section 19 of the Limitation Act is limited, so far as the signing of an acknowledgment by agents is concerned, to agents appointed by an act of the debtor himself, or in other words, by a contractual act. Explanation II does not cover the case of an agent who is otherwise appointed. Explanation II says, For the purposes of this section signed means signed either personally or by an agent duly authorized in this behalf." Reference is made to Section 21 which deals with the case of a person under disability, and lays down that the expression agent duly authorized in this behalf in Section 19 shall include his lawful guardian, committee or manager, or an agent duly authorized by such guardian, committee or manager to sign the acknowledgment. Section 21 is a new section which has been introduced, as is well-known, in view of conflicting decisions as to whether Section 19 covers the case of an acknowledgment made by a guardian. The argument advanced by Mr. K. Srinivasa Aiyangar is to the effect that although Explanation II does not say by an agent duly authorized by him, that is, by the person sought to be bound by the acknowledgment, yet it must be taken to mean that in as much as all other cases are dealt with by Section 21. Section 21 however only says that, in the case of a person under disability, agent shall include his lawful guardian, etc. It does not lay down that there can be no other agent duly authorized to make acknowledgment in the case of persons under disability. The words by an agent duly authorized in tills behalf in Explanation II in Section 19 was in force before the enactment of Section 21, and we cannot accept the contention that by Section 21 the legislature intended in any way to narrow the scope of Section 19. It is unnecessary for us to say whether Section 21 has widened its scope or not, or it has merely explained what was contained in Section 19 itself.

3. The authorities seem to be uniform against the appellants contention. The matter is fully dealt with by a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court consisting of the Chief Justice, Sir Lawrence Jenkins, and other learned Judges in Annapagauda v. Sangadiyyapa (1901) I.L.R. 26 Bom. 221, where it is laid down that the agent in Explanation II, Section 19 need not derive his authority from any contract. That was the case of a guardian and it was ruled that the guardian appointed under the Guardian and Wards Act was an agent within the meaning of Explanation II, if the terms of his appointment gave him authority to make acknowledgments. English cases are then noticed and the statement of law on the subject as given by Lord Westbury in Chinnery v. Evans (1864) 11 House of Lords cases 115, is cited to show that the law in England is also to the same effect. In Beti Maharani v. The Collector of Etawah (1894) I.L.R. 17 All. 198 their Lordships of the Privy Council upheld an acknowledgment made by the Court of Wards as being operative under Section 19 and that decision must be taken to be based on the principle that the agent mentioned therein may be one appointed under a statute and need not be appointed under contract. There are similar decisions of this Court in Kondamodalu Linga Reddi v. Alluri Sarvarayudu (1910) I.L.R. 34 Mad. 221, of the Calcutt











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