The court emphasized the requirements for dishonour, notice, and the liability of the drawer under the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

Abdur Rahim, J.

1. The suit which we are dealing with in this appeal was instituted with respect to a Hundi drawn by the 1st defendant, the appellant, on S.R.M.S. Ranganathan Chetty in Rangoon in favour of the 2nd defendant, who assigned it to 3rd defendant and the 3rd defendant assigned it to the 4th defendants father, who assigned it to the plaintiff. Several defences were raised but we need not deal with all of them. We wish to deal with the questions of fact whether there was presentment of the Hundi and in due time, whether there was dishonour and notice of dishonour, if any, given to the drawer as required by law. The question whether the Hundi was discharged by payment has also been argued before us. The learned Advocate-General has also raised a rather interesting question of law based on the provisions of Sections 61 and 74 of the Negotiable Instruments Act read with Sections 91, 92, 93, and 94. The case cannot be said to have been tried as satisfactorily as it might have been; but we have to some to a conclusion upon the evidence on record. The whole evidence regarding presentment and dishonour and the alleged discharge is of a very unsatisfactory kind. No witness from the firm of the drawer was examined in support of the case of the plaintiff as to presentment and no explanation is forthcoming for this omission, Nor has there been any attempt to produce the books of that firm which, it is likely; would have contained some record as to the fact of presentment of this bill if it was actually presented as is spoken to by P. W. No. 2. The bill is alleged to have been sent at the request of the 4th defendants father by a firm in Madura, called V.E.R.M. Firm, for collection. One of the men from that firm, the son of the proprietor, was examined as plaintiffs witness No. 5. He says that he received a letter saying that the bill had been presented for payment and that it was dishonoured. But no attempt was made to produce that letter, nor has any book of account or anything in writing been produced in support of the plaintiffs allegation. It was quite easy for the plaintiff to produce absolutely conclusive evidence on this point. It was argued by the learned Advocate-General that we ought to accept the evidence given by the plaintiff even though it is not the best evidence available, and such as it is, is unsatisfactory because the probabilities of the case, he contends, show that the allegations of the plaintiff are true. But the transaction to say the least was of a very peculiar character. We do not find any proper explanation for the fact that although the bill was presented some time in May or June 1913, if the evidence of the plaintiff is to be accepted on that point, it was noted on only in 1915 and no action was taken on the bill for two years. Then there is really no evidence that any notice of dishonour was given to the first defendant within a reasonable time after such dishonour. The plaintiff says that before instituting the suit, that is, some time in 1915 he ask ed the 1st defendant for payment and that he promised to pay. That seems to me to be an absolute untruth. The defense of the 1st defendant is that the bill had been long ago discharged. It is in-conceivable that, if the plaintiff made a demand upon him, he should have promised to pay. The learned Advocate-General has not really relied on the noting such as there is on this bill for the purpose of drawing any presumption of presentment and dishonour. It is a most peculiar entry by the Notary Public of Rangoon. All that it contains is noted for non-payment. It does not give the date of dishonour as required by Section 99 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Then there is no certificate of protest within the meaning of Sections 100 and 101 of the Act. It is only where there is a proper protest that Section 119 would apply requiring the Court to presume the fact of dishonour.

2. As regards the question of discharge, it is one of the pleas of the 1st d