The main legal point established in the judgment is that the period of limitation for filing a suit under Section 14 of the Madras Land Encroachment Act III of 1905 runs from the date when the assessment or penalty is actually collected, and not when it is merely imposed. The judgment also emphasizes that marginal notes to sections of an Act of the Indian Legislature cannot be referred to for construing the Act.

Kumaraswami Sastri, J.

1. The plaintiff is the appellant. He sued the Secretary of State for India in Council (Respondent) for a declaration that the property specified in the plaint belongs to him and is not liable to penal assessment, for an injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with the property and for refund of the penal assessment levied. The case for the plaintiff is that the property belongs to him absolutely and was never the property of the Government, that he was served with a notice from the Revenue Divisional Officer dated 15th July, 1914 purporting to be issued under Madras Act III of 1905, levying a penal assessment of Rs. 10 and that the amount was wrongly collected from him on the 21st July, 1914. The defence is that the property was Nattam Poramboke which the plaintiff trespassed upon, that the Government is entitled to levy the assessment claimed and that the suit is barred by limitation.

2. Both the District Munsif and on appeal the Subordinate Judge held that the suit was barred by limitation as it was brought more than six months after the 15th July, 1914, the date of the notice of the Divisional Officer informing the plaintiff that an assessment of Rs. 10 was levied owing to his having encroached on Government property.

3. The question raised in this Second Appeal is whether the period of six months specified in Section 14 of the Madras Land Encroachment Act III of 1905 is to be computed from the date of the imposition of the assessment or the date when it is actually collected from him.

4. Section 14 of the Act provides that Civil Courts shall not take cognizance of any suit instituted by persons aggrieved by any proceedings under that Act unless the suit is instituted within 6 months from the date of the cause of action. The explanation to the section states that the cause of action in respect of any assessment or penalty shall be deemed to arise on the date on which such assessment or penalty was levied." As, regards eviction or forfeitures the cause of action is said to arise on the date of eviction or forfeiture.

5. Both the Lower Courts have erred in construing Section 14 with reference to the marginal notes to Sections 3, 5 and 7 of the Act. It is now well settled that marginal notes to sections of an Act of the Indian Legislature cannot be referred to for the purpose of construing the Act. The view taken in Punardeo Narain Singh v. Ram Sarup Roy (1918) I.L.R. 20 Cal. 358 and Emperor v. Alloomya Husan (1918) I.L.R. 28 Bom. 120. at p. 112 has been affirmed by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Thakarain Balraj kunwar v. Rai Jagpatpal Singh (1984) L.R. 31 C.A. 132 : L.R. 26 A. 393 where Lord Macnaghten observed as follows: "It is well settled that marginal notes to the sections of an Act of Parliament cannot be referred to for the purpose of construing the Act. The contrary opinion originated in a mistake and, was exploded long ago. There seems to be no reason for giving to the marginal notes of an Indian Statute any greater authority than the marginal notes in an English Act of Parliament," The marginal notes do not throw much light on the question. It is significant that while the marginal notes to Section 3 and 9 would suggest that "levy" was used in the sense of imposition that marginal note to Section 15 uses the word in the sense of " collection." In the body of the Act the word " levy " is only used in Section 13 and obviously means " collected " as the clause provides that if any penalty has been levied from any person under Section 5 no similar penalty shall be levied under any other raw.

6. I am of opinion that the word " levied " in Section 14 means " collected " and that the period of limitation in Section 14 runs from the date when the assessment or penalty is actually collected and not when it is merely imposed. The decision of the revenue officer under Section 3 of the Act to impose assessment, need not be on notice to the party as Section 7 of the Act requires