Abdur Rahim, J.

1. The sole question for determination in this Letters Patent Appeal is whether the suit in which it has arisen and which was instituted under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure with respect to a temple in North Malabar is maintainable, the point being whether Mr. T.R. Ramachandra Aiyar, one of the plaintiffs, has an interest within the meaning of that section in the temple concerned. Mr. T.R. Ramachandra Aiyar who is a leading practitioner of this Court and a Brahmin resides in Madras while the temple is situate in Tellicherry. It is an ancient temple of some celebrity and is dedicated to the deity Sri Rama. Mr. T.R. Ramachandra Aiyar is a member of the Dharma Eakshana Sabah among whose objects is included institution of suits for the protection and due application of Hindu religious endowments. It also appears that when, on one or two occasions in the exercise of his profession he went to Tellicherry, he attended this temple1 and worshipped there, and it was further stated that he was likely to do so if he again went to Tellicherry. But the interest of Mr. T.R. Ramachandra Aiyar in this temple within the meaning of the Code is not supported on any of these facts but on his right as a Hindu to perform worship therein.

2. The question is one of considerable importance, and having given my best consideration to it, I have come to the conclusion that the view of the law expressed in the Judgment of Kumaraswami Sastri, J., is right. I think that the history of legislation on the subject makes it sufficiently clear that the legislature intended by the words having an interest in the trust to include in the case of a temple or a mosque all persons having a right to perform worship or to say their prayers therein. It is not necessary to go back further than Act XX of 1863, an act which is expressly referred to in Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure itself and is still in force. That Act, as is well known, was passed primarily to enable the Government to divest itself of the direct management of Hindu and Muhammadan religious endowments which they had assumed under certain regulations. It also contains provisions for suits to secure the due administration of religious trusts by the trustees, managers or members of Committees. By Section 14 such right of suit is conferred on persons interested in any mosque, temple or religious establishment. Section 15 then explains that the interest required in order to entitle a person to sue under the last preceding section need not be a pecuniary or a direct or immediate, interest or such an interest as would entitle the person suing to take any part in the management or superintendence of trusts. Any person having a right of attendance, or having been in the habit of attending at the performance of the worship or service of any mosque, temple or religious establishment, or of partaking in the benefit of any distribution of alms shall be deemed to be a person interested within the meaning of the last preceding section. It is probable that this elaborate explanation of what would be deemed to be sufficient interest to maintain a suit under Act XX of 1863 was considered necessary on account of the decisions under the Romillys Act, such as In re Bedfords Charities. (1819) 2 Swans 471 : 36 E.R. 696 Also it is clear that the Indian Legislature in 1863 did not think it would lead to undue harassment of trustees of religious foundations or to the institution of frivolous and vexatious suits, if persons entitled to worship in a temple or to say prayers in a mosque were vested with the right to institute suits to secure their proper management. Act XX of 1863 however applied only to religious foundations and the legislature deemed it advisable in the Civil Procedure Code of 1877 for the first time to make a specific provision for suits instituted for the purpose of remedying abuses relating to the administration of public charities generally. But by Section 539 of that C