Oldfield, J.

1. The execution application before us was so far from being in the proper form when it was presented, that after eight months the petitioner appellant here crossed it out and amended it byre-writing it as a whole. The interval had been spent almost entirely in appellants Vakil asking for and the lower Court mechanically granting extension of time in instalments of two weeks. The case is not creditable either to the Vakil or the Court.

2. The first point taken is that for purposes of limitation the date on which the application was finally admitted, not that on which it was first presented, is the starting point, because appellants interest is to put that starting point as late as possible. Order XXI, Rule 17 (2), of Schedule I of the Code of Civil Procedure, however, lays down that an amended application shall be deemed to have been presented on the date on which it was first presented. It is suggested that this provision does not abrogate the law, as it stood before its enactment, that the presentation should be treated as effected when the application was finally accepted, the decree-holder thus having his choice between two dates. It is sufficient that, even