The main legal point established in the judgment is that the suit for partition of Zamindari was barred by limitation under Article 127 of the Limitation Act, as the minors were aware of their exclusion from the estate and the period of three years from attainment of majority cannot be extended.

Abdur Rahim, J.

1. The suit of the appellants has been dismissed on the ground of limitation, none of the other issues raised in the case having been tried at all. I may say at the outset that though in the result, I agree in the conclusion of the learned District Judge, I do not think that it was a prudent course on his part to, have confined himself to the issue of limitation.

2. The suit was to enforce partition of a partible Zamindari in the district of Ganjam. The two plaintiffs claim to be the legitimate sons of the last proprietor Vasudeva Deo, and their case is that they are entitled to one-third share each in the estate while the 1st defendant, the son of Vasudeva Deo by another wife, is entitled to the remaining one-third. The plaintiffs further alleged that Vasudeva Deo left a will under which the plaintiffs were entitled to one-fourth share, their claim therefore is in the alternative to one-fourth share of the estate in case they fail to prove that they are the legitimate sons of Vasudeva Deo. Vasudeva Deo died in January 1898 and the Court of Wards took charge of the estate and managed it till the 1st defendant attained majority sometime in 1916 and then made over the estate to him. The mother of the plaintiff who claimed to be the married wife of the deceased proprietor lived till April 1911. Immediately after his death she tried her best to establish the status as a widow and that of her sons as the legitimate sons of Vasudeva Deo. Both the plaintiffs and the 1st defendant were infants at the time of the proprietors death, the 1st. defendant being the youngest of them. The 1st plaintiff attained the majority, that is to say the age of eighteen in November 1909. The 2nd plaintiff attained the age of eighteen in August 1913. The suit was filed on the 27th September 1916, that is nearly seven years after the 1st plaintiff became eighteen years old and three years and a little more than a month after the 2nd plaintiff became eighteen years of age.

3. The main point on which the learned District Judge has found that the suit if barred is that, as far back as 1898 when the mother of the plaintiffs was acting as their guardian, their title to any share in the estate as heirs or under the alleged will of Vasudeva Deo was denied and the Court of Wards obtained possession of the estate on behalf of the 1st defendant and excluded the plaintiffs from possession. Admittedly, if these facts are correctly found, the suit would be barred under Article 127 of the Limitation Act unless the proposition of law contended for on behalf of the appellant can be established that Article 127 of the Limitation Act has on application to the case of minors because no knowledge of exclusion can be imputed to them.

4. There is really no dispute about what happened. It is quite sufficient to go through the different letters and petitions written to the Court of Wards by the mother of the plaintiffs and the replies and the orders thereon to form a conclusion as to whether there was or was not exclusion of the plaintiffs within the meaning of Article 127 of the Limitation Act. I may say at once that it can hardly be disputed upon the facts that the Court of Wards took possession of the estate purporting to act solely on behalf of the 1st defendant and not on behalf of any persons who may be found entitled to the estate. It is unnecessary to decide whether under the statute the Court of Wards can take charge of an estate in that way that is, on behalf of any one who may be found entitled to it. In this case, there can be no doubt whatever that it treated the 1st defendant alone as its ward and managed the estate on his behalf. I may mention however that the Court of Wards Act in its various sections contemplates that when it takes charge of an estate, it is to act on behalf of a particular ward or wards who may be suffering from disability, such as, minority or otherwise specified in the Act. I need only mention some of the sections which ma