The court established that a District Judge does not have the inherent power to review his own decision under Section 10 of Act XX of 1863, and the power to review must be explicitly conferred by statute.

Oldfield, J.

1. The only question we have to decide is whether a District Jude can at the instance of a party review an order passed by him under Section 10 of Act XX of 1863.

2. The Act contains no explicit provision for a review and petitioner has accordingly supported his claim to one with reference to (1) the Code of Civil Procedure (2) the inherent power of the Court.

3. As regards the Code there is nothing in the Act to apply its provisions and they can be applicable, if at all, only with reference to Section 141 of the Code itself. That section however does no more than provide for the procedure to be adopted by Courts of civil jurisdiction in dealing with matters before them. It does not authorize an appeal, since that would not be a mere matter of procedure, but the recognition of substantive right, which must be conferred in explicit terms. Damodara Menon v. Kittappa Menon (1911) I.L.R. 36 Mad. 16 : 21 M.L.J. 613. And similarly it confers no right to a review. For we have not been shown how the one right stands on a different footing from the other.

4. To turn to the alternative ground for petitioners claim, that the power or duty to review an erroneous decision is inherent in the Court, he has supported it mainly with reference to Syed Tuffozool Hossein Khan v. Ragunath Persad (1871) 14 M.I.A. 44. I referred to the material dicta in that case in my judgment in Muthia Chettiar v. Bava Sahib (1914) 27 M.L.J. 605 and I am still of opinion that the Courts action, which the judicial Committee then approved, consisted merely in the recognition that previous proceedings authorised by it were void. I may now add that the case can be regarded on the widest construction only as authorising the Court to repudiate its previous proceedings on the ground that they were without jurisdiction, Debi Baksh Sing v. Habib Shah (1913) I.L.R. 35 All. 331 being similarly decided in very similar circumstances or alternatively on the ground referred to in the judgment that a mistake had been made through inadvertence. Again in Kala Mea v. Harperink (1908) I.L.R. 36 Cal. 323 the right to review was recognised, because the proceedings were vitiated by the fraud or misrepresentation of an officer of the Court.

5. These cases however merely constitute exceptions to a rule which is otherwise well established; and the facts in none of them in any degree resemble those alleged before us. For the rule that a Court cannot review its own decision, except so far as it is permitted to do so by statute is of general authority, since it is recognised alike in England, for instance in Drew v. Willis (1891) 1 Q.B.D. 450 and in India in David Nadar v. Manikka Vachaka Pandarasannathi (1909) 19 M.L.J. 725 : 33 Mad. 65, Lala Prayag Lal v. Jai Narayan Singh (1895) I.L.R 22 Cal, 419 and Baijnath Ram Goenka v. Hand Kumar (1913) I.L.R 40 Cal. 552. (P.C.). And here the petitioner has alleged only that, if he had had a better opportunity of laying his case before the lower court, he would have been able to adduce evidence, which would have resulted in a different decision.

6. In these circumstances there was no ground on which the lower court could be asked to review its order. The Civil Revision Petition must therefore be dismissed with costs.

Seshagiri Aiyar, J.

7. I am of the same opinion.

8. The question raised in the order of the learned District Judge is a very important one and I shall therefore say a few words. The ground has been cleared considerably after hearing the very able arguments of Mr. Sitarama Rao who appeared for the counter-petitioner.

9. It was argued by the learned vakil for the petitioner that as under the ruling of the Judicial Committee in Balakrishna Udayar v. Vasudeva Aiyar (1917) I.L.R. 40 Mad 793 the District Judge in filling up a vacancy under Section 10 of Act XX of 1863 is acting judicially, his orders are clothed with all the rights and are subject to all the disabilities which attach to his judgments in an ordinary civil action. I do