The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of the jurisdiction and power of the High Court under the Criminal Procedure Code and the Government of India Act, as well as the expediency of trying all charges together for the ends of justice.

Sadasiva Aiyar, J.

1. This is an application praying to quash the order of commitment passed by the Chief Presidency Magistrate in Calendar Case No. 4556 of 1919. The commitment was made to the High Court Sessions. The application is made under Sections 215 and 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code and Section 107 of the Government of India Act. The offences with which the petitioners are charged relate to acts of kidnapping and theft committed in Madras and the offence of murder committed on the Avadi-Poonamalle Road within the jurisdiction of the Sessions Court of Chingleput. They all formed parts of the same transaction.

2. So far as the objection based on the alleged want of jurisdiction of the Chief Presidency Magistrate over the offences which took place on the Avadi-Poonamallee Road are concerned, that defect, assuming it to exist, is clearly cured by Section 531 Criminal Procedure Code.

3. Then there is the more serious question, that is, the commitment having been made to this High Court Sessions as regards the offence which took place in the Chingleput District whether the High Court has got power in the exercise of its original criminal jurisdiction to try that offence and whether even if it has not, the defect is cured by Section 53.1 or 532. I think the policy of the Criminal Procedure Code as shown by Sections 531 to 538 is to uphold in most cases the orders passed by the Criminal Court which was lacking in local jurisdiction or which had committed illegalities or irregularities unless failure of justice has been occasioned or is likely to be occasioned through such want of jurisdiction or such illegalities or irregularities. However there is a decision of this Court in Assistant Sessions Judge, North Arcot v. Ramammal (1911) I.L.R. 36 Mad. 887 : 22 M.L.J. 141 to which my learned brother was a party and which holds that if the Sessions Court to which a commitment was made had no local jurisdiction over the place where the offence took place such commitment should be quashed (though, of course after the trial had taken place to its termination, Section 531 might cure the defect). It is unnecessary for me to ex -press any final opinion whether the decision in Queen Empress v. Ram Dei (1896) I.L.R. 18 All. 350 which seems to be opposed to the decision in Assistant Sessions Judge, North Arcot v. Ramammal (1911) I.L.R. 36 Mad. 887 : 22 M.L.J. 141 does not take the better view. I shall therefore proceed on the footing that in the matter before us. Assistant Sessions Judge, Noth Arcot v. Ramammal (1911) I.L.R. 36 Mad. 887 : 22 M.L.J. 141 should be followed.

4. The next question is whether the High Court in its original criminal jurisdiction has power to try a case of murder committed in the Chingleput District. In Queen Empress v. James Ingle (1892) I.L.R. 16 Bom. 200 which was a case almost similar to the present, Mr. Robertson for the prosecution contended that under the Letters Patent the High Court had criminal jurisdiction to try cases arising throughout the presidency. Clause 24 of the Letters Patent of this Court says that the High Court of Judicature at Madras shall have extraordinary original criminal jurisdiction over all persons residing in places within the Jurisdiction of any Court now subject to the superintendence of the said High Court.

5. It is objected that the High Court Sessions will then be flooded with commitments if it is held to have the original criminal jurisdiction over the whole presidency. I think that it was to prevent that inconvenience that Section 206, Clause (2) was enacted prohibiting magistrates from committing to the High Court where they could commit to a Sessions Court. In the above quoted case, Queen Empress v. James Ingle (1892) I.L.R. 16 Bom. 200. Mr. justice Farran refused to quash the commitment made wrongly to the Bombay High Court Session, evidently accepting the contention of Mr. Robertson already referred to. The present case is therefore not a case of want of jurisdiction in