1919 Supreme(Mad) 120
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MARAS
A Rahim, Spencer
Indoji Jithaji
Versus
Kothapalli Rama Charlu
Decided On : 11 April, 1919
The main legal point established in the judgment is the determination of ancestral property in the hands of the 1st defendant and the voidability of Exhibit II under Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act.
Headnote:
Promissory Notes - Ancestral Property - Tara Chand v. Reeb Ram 3 M.H.C.R. 50, Nagalingam Pillai v. Ramachandra Tevar 24 M. 429 : 11 M.L. 210 - The court discussed the ancestral property in the hands of the 1st defendant and the validity of Exhibit II, a release executed by Rangacharlu in favor of the 1st defendant. The court held that the property would be ancestral property in the hands of the 1st defendant, as per the rulings of Tara Chand v. Reeb Ram 3 M.H.C.R. 50 and Nagalingam Pillai v. Ramachandra Tevar 24 M. 429 : 11 M.L. 210. The court also discussed the intention to separate and the effect of Exhibit II on Rangacharlu's joint status.
Fact of the Case:
The plaintiff sued on several promissory notes executed by Ranga Charlu, seeking to recover the amount out of his assets. The main questions were whether the properties in dispute were ancestral or self-acquired, the validity of Exhibit II, and whether Rangcharlu had separated himself before his death.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the property would be ancestral property in the hands of the 1st defendant. It held that Exhibit II was voidable at the instance of the plaintiff under Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act. The court also found that Rangacharlu had expressed an intention to sever the joint status through Exhibit II.
Issues: The main issues were the nature of the disputed properties, the validity of Exhibit II, and whether Rangcharlu had separated himself before his death.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the property would be ancestral property in the hands of the 1st defendant, and Exhibit II was voidable at the instance of the plaintiff under Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act. It also held that Rangacharlu had expressed an intention to sever the joint status through Exhibit II.
Final Decision: The court reversed the judgment of the District Judge and decreed in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of Rs. 3,287.80 with interest at 6 per cent until payment. The appellant was entitled to costs from the respondents both in this and in the lower Court.
Abdur Rahim, J.
1. The plaintiff, appellant, sued on several promissory notes executed by one Ranga Charlu, who died about six months before the institution of the suit, asking for a decree for Rs. 3,237.80 on account of principal and interest due on the notes and seeking to recover the amount out of his assets consisting of the share which, it is alleged, Rangacharlu bad in the properties in the possession of the 1st defendant, his father, defendants Nos. 2 to 4, his brothers, and the 5th defendant, his widow. The main questions are, firstly, are the properties in dispute the ancestral properties of the family in the hands of the 1st defendant or his self-acquired and separate property, secondly, if ancestral, was there a division of status between Rangacharlu on the one hand and his father and brothers on the other, and, thirdly, is the instrument, Exhibit II, which is described as a release executed by Rangacharlu in favour of the 1st defendant, valid and operative as being made in bona fide settlement of a family dispute or is it liable to be avoided as being made to defeat Rangacharlus creditors?
2. The 1st defendant obtained the property under a Will of his father, dated the 12th September 1910, wherein he describes the properties as his self-acquisition. He then bequeaths the properties in equal halves to the 1st defendant and to the minor son of the testators deceased younger brother, his undivided co parcener, and some small amounts to other persons. The main bequest was to the testators son, the 1st defendant, and to the younger brothers son in equal moieties. There can be little doubt in my opinion that upon those fasts the property would be ancestral property in the hands of the 1st defendant, according to the ruling of this Court in Tara Chand v. Reeb Ram 3 M.H.C.R. 50 at p. 55 and Nagalingam Pillai v. Ramachandra Tevar 24 M. 429 : 11 M.L. 210. The question was fully discussed in the last-mentioned case, where it is laid down that "a father may leave his self acquired property to descend to his sons as ancestral property or if he makes any disposition of it in favour of a son, he is at liberty to preserve for it the character of ancestral property. Whether in any given case, the property was intended to pass to the son as ancestral or as self acquired property is a question of intention turning on the construction of the instrument of gift. If there are no words indicating a contrary intention, the natural inference should be that the father intended the sons to take the property as their ancestral estate." I may mention that the property in dispute there had also been devised under a Will, so that the ruling is a direct authority on the question before us. While laying down this proposition the learned Judges were careful to point out that any observation in the case reported as Tara Chand v. Reeb Ram 3 M.H.C.R. 50 at p. 55. to the effect that a Hindu cannot make a free disposition of his self-acquired property by gift or by testamentary disposition, was no longer good law in the light of later decisions. The decision in Nagalingam Pillai v. Ramachandra Tevar 24 M. 429 : 11 M.L. 210 has been followed in a recent case reported as Venkitaramiah Pantulu v. Subramaniam Pillai 26 Ind. Cas. 393 : 16 M.L.T. 489 and as I read the judgment of Sadasiva Aiyar and Napier, JJ., in Krishnaswami Naidu v. Seelhalakshmi Animal 31 Ind. Cas. 803 : 18 M.L.T. 542 : 3 L.W. 317 39 M. 1029 I do not think that they meant to question the correctness of that ruling. I should bold, therefore, that the law on the point as enunciated in Tara Chand v. Reeb Ram 3 M.H.C.R. 50 at p. 55 and Nagalingam Pillai v. Ramcchandra Tevar 24 M. 429 : 11 M.L. 210 is settled so far as this Presidency is concerned in Calcutta the rule seems to be even more absolute in favour of such property being regarded as ancestral. See Hatarimal Babu v. Abani Nath 18 Ind. Cas. 625 17 C.L.J. 38 at p. 43 : 17 C.W.N. 280. In Bombay, however, the law as expounded at lea