IN THE HIGH COURT OF MARAS
Hallingal Moosa Kutti
Versus
The Secretary Of State For India
Decided On : 22 July, 1919
Registration Act - Lease of Land - Admissibility of Document in Evidence
Fact of the Case:
The 1st defendant took a lease of certain lands near a Railway station from the Government for three years, despite a clause in the lease prohibiting the erection of buildings. The Secretary of State filed a suit for ejectment.
Finding of the Court:
The Courts over-ruled the defendant's contentions that the lease was not admissible in evidence due to lack of registration and that the provision restraining the defendant from erecting buildings was obnoxious to the Malabar Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act.
Issues: Admissibility of unregistered lease in evidence and the applicability of the provision restraining the defendant from erecting buildings under the Malabar Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the lease of land is admissible in evidence despite lack of registration, and that the provision restraining the defendant from erecting buildings is not within the mischief of the Malabar Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act.
Final Decision: The decrees of the Courts below were confirmed, and the Second Appeal was dismissed with costs. The appellant was given two months to remove the buildings erected by him.
1. Two questions of some importance have been agued before us in this case. By Exhibit A the 1st defendant took a lease of certain lands near a Railway station from the Government. The lease was for three years and provided for a rent of Rs. 150 per annum. It contained a clause that the defendant should not erect buildings on the land. Notwithstanding this undertaking he put up buildings on it. The suit is by the Secretary of State for ejectment. The defendant pleaded that as Exhibit A was not registered it was not admissible in evidence; and secondly that the provision restraining the defendant from erecting buildings is obnoxious to Section 19 of Act I of 1900 of the Malabar Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act. Both these contentions were over-ruled by the Courts below. We think they are right.
2. It was argued for the appellant that the first question relating to registration is covered by Munshilal v. The Notified Area of Baraut (1914) I.L.R. 36 All. 176. With all respect to the learned Judges we are unable to follow it. The learned Judges say that the words " other documents purporting to be or to evidence grants or assignments by Government of land or of any interest in land " in Section 90 Clause (1)(d) of the Indian Registration Act should be read ejusdem generis with the preceding words sanads and inam title deeds. We see no ground for applying this principle of construction to the section. As was pointed out in Angus v. Dalton (1878) L.R. 4 Q.B. 166, we have first to ascertain from the language of the section the class of cases which were intended to be affected. If the intention is clear the occasion for the introduction of the ejusdem generis rule of interpretation would not arise. (See also the other cases collected at p. 546 of Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes), In the present case the object of the legislature in enacting Section 90 of the Registration Act seems to be to enumerate the class of documents executed by or on behalf of the Government which should not be affected by the previous sections relating to registration. In this view there is no ground for imputing to the legislature a restrictive scope of the operation of Clause (1)(d) of Section 90. Further even applying the principle we are not satisfied that a lease of land is not of the same character as a sanad. As the learned Government Pleader pointed out there are sanads by Government and Zamindars which grant property on favourable terms. Therefore the idea implied in a sanad is not that of a gift without reservation. For these reasons we are unable to agree with the Allahabad High Court that a lease is not within the sub-clause. A further argument of the learned counsel for the appellant requires a little more consideration. He contended, and in this also he is supported by Munshi Lal v. The Notified Area of Baraut (1914) I.L.R. 36 All. 176 at 179, that the words "grants or assignments by Government of land or of any interest in land " would exclude a lease. We are unable to accept this contention either. Turning to Section 17 of the Registration Act we find in Sub-clause 2(vii) the use of the word grant, and that word is used with reference to transfers and receipts enumerated in Clause 1(b) and 1(c) of Section 17. In that connection the word has the meaning of transfer and does not denote a gift. We are therefore of opinion that the words grants or assignments of interest in Section 90(1)(d) are comprehensive enough to include a lease. The document therefore is admissible in evidence.
3. The learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court got over the difficulty connected with the Crown Grants Act (XV of 1895) in a manner which we are unable to accept as sound. Section 2 of the Act refers to " grant or other transfer of land or of any interest therein." This language shows that the word grant, can be employed to denote a transfer of land. In the second place it is clear that all transfers of land of every description are within t
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