The main legal point established in the judgment is that the executing court should handle matters relating to the rival rights of the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor in execution, discharge, or satisfaction of the decree, and that the fact that others are interested in the result of the decision should not affect the jurisdiction and competency of the executing court to deal with the matter.

Abdur Rahim, C.J.

1. This is a reference to the Full Bench made in certain appeals against orders which arose under the circumstances mentioned in the order of reference. Briefly speaking, the claims of the decree-holder-purchaser of the disputed property in execution of a money decree and of his vendee having been disallowed as against the purchasers under a mortgage decree, one of them being the decree-holder himself with respect to a part of the property, the purchaser of the other part being a stranger, the question arose whether the order of the lower Court comes within the purview of Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure and is therefore appeal-able. The suit on the mortgage was instituted after the attachment in execution of the money decree and the sale under the money decree which was subject to the mortgage was made between the dates of the preliminary mortgage decree and the final decree. I shall proceed on the basis assumed in the order of reference that the question that has arisen relates to execution, discharge, or satisfaction of the decree within the meaning of Section 47, and that all that we are asked is whether such a question arose between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed or their representatives.

2. As I understand the facts, the question in the appeal arose in execution of the mortgage decree; and, so far as the decree holder-purchaser is concerned, there can be no question of his position as he is a party to the suit.

3. But the decisions of this Court as to who are to be deemed, within the meaning of Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to be the representatives of the parties to the suit in which the decree which is being executed was passed are in a state of considerable conflict. On the question whether the purchaser can be regarded as the representative of the decree-holder in cases arising between him and the judgment-debtor or his representative, Moore J. had no hesitation in Kasinatha Ayyar v. Uthumansa Rowthan (1902) I.L.R. 25 M. 529, in holding that the auction-purchaser, even if he was not the decree-holder, was the representative of the judgment-creditor, basing his opinion on the Privy Council ruling in Prosunno Kumar Sanyal v. Kali Das Sayal (1892) I.L.R. 19 C. 683, and on the full Bench ruling of the Calcutta High Court in Ishan Chunder Sirkar v. Beni Madhub Sirkar (1896) I.L.R. 24 C. 62, and on that of a Divisional Bench of the same Court in Duar Buksh Sirkar v. Fatic Jali (1898) I.L.R. 26 C. 250. Bhashyam Aiyangar J., the other learned Judge, did not express any dissent from that view, but pointed out that the order was none the less an order under Section 244(now Section 47) because it was also passed under Sections 318 and 334 of the Code of Civil Procedure (corresponding to Rules 95, 97 and 98 of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure). The ruling was followed by White C.J. and Subramania Aiyar J. in Sandhu Taraganar v. Hussain Sahib (1904) I.L.B. 28 M. 87, by White C.J. and San. karan Nair J. in Arthanari Chettiar v. Nagoji Rao (1912) M.W.N. 510, and by Benson und Wallis JJ.in Manikka Odayan v. Rajagopala Pillai (1907) I.L.R. 30 M. 507. But the opposite view is expressed by White C.J. sitting with Miller J. in Krishna Satapasti v. Sarasvatula Sambasiva Row (1908) I.L.R. 31 M. 177, and by Wallis and Krishnaswami Aiyar JJ. in N. Narayana Iyengarv. Veerabhadra Pillai (1910) I.L.R. 34 M. 417, and has been accepted by Sadasiva Aiyar and Bakewell JJ. in Subbamma v. Chennayya (1917) I.L.R. 41 M. 467. In this Court, therefore, the conflict of opinion on the point is such that one could not say that there is a clear preponderance of authority in support of one view rather than the other.

4. As regards the other High Courts it was held by Jenkins C.J.in Magan Lal v. Doshi Mulji (1901) I.L.R. 25 B. 631 that an auction purchaser could not be regarded as the representative of the decree-holder for the purposes of an application under Section 310(A) of the Old