The main legal point established in the judgment is that a Muhammadan widow has the right to retain possession of her deceased husband's property for her dower, provided that the possession is lawful and obtained without force or fraud. Additionally, the court affirmed that the widow's right to retain possession for her dower is transferable.

Abdur Rahim, Kt. Offg. C.J.

1. The first question asked by this reference is whether a Muhammadan widow, who is lawfully in possession of her husbands property after his death but not by virtue of any agreement with his other heirs, is entitled to retain such possession until the dower due to her has been paid or satisfied, before the property in her possession is divided among the heirs.

2. In the Allahabad and Calcutta High Courts there have been a long series of decisions, some of them conflicting with the others, on the subject of a Muhammadan widows lien for dower, but in this Court the question is practically bare of authority. There are also four decisions of the Privy Council in this connection, the latest being in the case of Hamira Bibi v. Zubaida Bibi (1916) I.L.R., 38 All., 581 (P.C.). Our main task is to ascertain whether in the course of their judgment in the last case the Judicial Committee wanted to confirm the view of the law expounded by the Chief Justice, Sir John Edge, of the Allahabad High Court in Amanat-un-nissa v. Bashir-un-nissa (1895) I.L.R., 17 All., 77, restricting the lien of the widow to cases where she had entered upon possession in order to satisfy her dower debt under an agreement with her husband or her husbands other heirs, or the view of the law expounded in Amani Begam v. Muhammad Karim-ullah (1894) I.L.R., 16 All., 225, Ramzan Ali Khan v. Asghari Begam (1910) I.L.R., 32 All., 563, Sahebjan Bewa v. Ansaruddin I.L.R., 38 Calc., 475; where it was held that the lien of a widow in possession does not depend upon any such agreement but upon the fact of her being in possession of her husbands property for the satisfaction of her dower provided she obtained possession of the property in question lawfully and without. force or fraud.

3. There is no difficulty as to the interpretation of what their Lordships of the Privy Council actually say in Hamira Bibi v. Zubaida Bibi (1916) I.L.R., 38 All., 581 at p. 588. The passage runs thus:

Naturally the idea of payment of interest on the deferred portion of the dower does not enter into the conception of the parties. But the dower ranks as a debt and the wife is entitled, along with other creditors, to have it satisfied on the death of the husband out of his estate. Her right, however, is no greater than that of any other unsecured creditor, except that if she lawfully, with the express or implied consent of the husband, or his other heirs, obtains possession of the whole or part of his estate, to satisfy her claim with the rents and issues accruing there from, she is entitled to retain such possession until it is satisfied. This is called the widows lien for dower, and this is the only creditors lien of the Mussalman law which has received recognition in the British Indian Courts and at this Board.

4. In that case, however, the only question for determination before the Judicial Committee was whether the widow in possession was entitled to any interest or compensation in respect of her unpaid dower and the arguments on either side were concentrated on that point. So far as it appears, the widows right to remain in possession until her dower was satisfied was not disputed, at any rate before the Privy Council, and the fact in that case was that she had been allowed by the other heirs to take or remain in possession of the whole estate to satisfy her claim for dower. Ameer-oon-Nissa v. Moorad-oon-Nissa (1855) 6 M.I.A., 211, Mussumat Beebee Bachun v. Sheik Hamid Hossein (1871) 14 M.I.A., 377, Sahebjan Bewa v. Ansaruddin (1911) I.L.R., 38 Calc., 475 and Ramzan Ali Khan v. Asghari Begam (1910) I.L.R., 32 All., 563, were all cited, in connection with the point under consideration of the Judicial Committee, as to the widows right to interest or compensation in respect of her unpaid dower, and it seems to be clear from the report that their Lordships attention was no-where directed to any question relating to the circumstances under which the widows right to r