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1919 Supreme(Mad) 310
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MARAS
A Rahim
Sreemantha Raja Yarlagada
Versus
Renduchintala Subbiah And Ors.
Decided On : 13 November, 1919
The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of the Madras Estates Land Act, particularly the provisions related to the classification of land as private or ryoti, the effect of Section 8 on conversion of ryoti land into private land, and the jurisdiction of Civil Courts in such matters.
Headnote:
Interpretation of Madras Estates Land Act - Cultivated land - Conversion of ryoti land into Kamatam - Jurisdiction of Civil Courts - Ejectment of defendants - Home-farm land - Occupancy rights - Union of melwaram and kudiwaram interest - Conversion of ryoti land into private land - Provisions of Estates Land Act - Custom and evidence of letting as private land - Pasturage lease and jurisdiction of Civil Courts
Fact of the Case:
The plaintiff, a Zemindar, sued to eject the defendant from cultivated and waste land, claiming them as his private or home-farm land. The suit was dismissed on the ground that the land was ryoti within the meaning of the Madras Estates Land Act, and the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to entertain such suits was excluded. The plaintiff appealed, alleging that the land was always private or was converted into private land prior to the Act coming into operation.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the land was ryoti up to 1873 and had never been directly cultivated by the plaintiff or his predecessors. The defendants were in possession on the crucial date, and if the land was ryoti, they acquired permanent occupancy rights from the date the Act came into force. The court also held that the plaintiff failed to establish conversion of the land into private land. The court dismissed the appeal and the memorandum of cross-objections.
Issues: The main issue was whether the land was private or ryoti, and whether the Civil Courts had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The court also considered the conversion of ryoti land into private land and the nature of the lease for waste land as pasturage only.
Ratio Decidendi: The court interpreted the provisions of the Estates Land Act, including the definition of private land, the union of melwaram and kudiwaram interest, and the effect of Section 8 on conversion of ryoti land into private land. The court also considered the evidence of custom and letting as private land, and the nature of the lease for waste land as pasturage only.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the appeal and the memorandum of cross-objections, holding that the land remained ryoti and the plaintiff failed to establish conversion into private land. The court also upheld the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to make the decree in favor of the plaintiff.
Abdur Rahim, J.
1. I agree in the conclusion arrived at by my learned brother in his judgment which I had the advantage of reading but as the appeal raises a question of some importance relating to the interpretation of the Madras Estates Land Act I shall briefly give my reasons.
2. The plaintiff who is the appellant before us sued to eject the defendant from nine kattis or 153 acres of cultivated land claiming them as his privafe or home-farm land and also from 65 kattis of waste land in the village of Mejuri in the Zemin-dari of Chellapalli otherwise called Devaralakota. The appeal relates to the land of the former description with respect tp which the suit was dismissed and the memorandum of objections, filed by the defendants is against the decree in favour of the appellant with respect to the waste land. I shall first deal with the appeal in which the only question raised is whether the 9 kattis of cultivated land in suit are the home-farm land of the Zemindar. If the finding of the Subordinate Judge that they do not form his home-farm land is correct then the suit was rightly dismissed both dn the ground that such a suit is excluded from the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts and also because the plaintiff would have no right to eject the defendants.
3. With reference to this question one important fact is to be borne in mind. In 1864 in consequence of a violent cyclone and the action of the sea the land in dispute was flooded and, owing to saline deposits, could not be cultivated certainly for 2 or 3 years and, according to the appellant, for 8 or 9 years afterwards. His case is that he himself reclaimed the lands and from 1873 let out the lands as kamatam down to about March, 1909, when disputes arose between him and the defendants and there were proceedings in the Magistrates Court in consequence. The Magistrate having upheld the defendants possession by his order dated 29-11-1910 the plaintiff has filed this suit.
4. That the Zemindar has been describing these lands as kamatam in the leases granted since 1873 and increasing the rent from time to time and stipulating for the quitting of the lands at the end of the terms mentioned in the leases is admitted. It is also found, and that finding has not been challenged before us, that in some cases the lands have changed hands. The evidence as to whether the lands in dispute were uncultivable during the entire period between 1864 and 1873 and whether the planitiff himself reclaimed the lands is neither very clear nor consistent. On the whole I am inclined to accept the conclusion of the learned Subordinate Judge on the point set out in paragraph 18 of. his judgment. If the case of the plaintiff was true accounts should have been forthcoming to show that he spent money on reclamation of the lands or that he directly cultivated them in the years 1874 or 1885 to 1887. The explanation for non-production cf accounts relating to that period is not satisfactory. The Subordinate Judge has also given other reasons in support of his conclusion and it is necessary to repeat them That the land was in the occupation of ryots before 1864 is supported by strong evidence. The cultivation accounts of fasli 1254--Exs. II, II-a and XI and other documents discussed in the judgment of the learned trial Judge clearly support the case of the defendants on this point. It therefore comes to this: that before 1864 the land was under the cultivation of ryots as ryofi land, and from 1864 onwards the Zemindar tried to treat the land as his Kamatam, but he never in fact as found by the subordinate Judge cultivated the land himself, nor is it proved that he reclaimed any portion of it. He certainly in 1he leases that he granted described the land as Kamatam, varied the rent from time to time and in many cases changed the ryots.
5. The two main points raised by the appellant are firstly that it was Kamatam land from the very beginning, and secondly that even if it was ryoti land, he converted it into Ka
