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1919 Supreme(Mad) 341

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MARAS
Spencer
Kadhir Masthan Rowther
Versus
Segammal
Decided On : 4 December, 1919

The main legal point established in the judgment is that a lease of trust property exceeding the trustee's powers is voidable, not void, and can be enforced until it is avoided by the trustee or somebody interested in the trust.

Headnote:

Trustee's Power - Permanent Lease - Indian Trusts Act (Act II of 1882) - Sections 36, 30 - Guardian and Wards Act (Act VIII of 1890) - Section 30

Fact of the Case:

The plaintiff, as the assignee of a permanent lease granted by the trustee of a trust, sought to recover possession of the property from the tenant. The lower courts held that the trustee had no power to alienate the trust property and that his alienation was void and conveyed no title to the plaintiff.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the lower courts were wrong in deciding the case based on the trustee's power to grant a permanent lease, and the appeal was allowed. The court remanded the suit to the Court of first instance for trial upon the other issues in the case.

Issues: The main issue was whether the trustee's grant of a permanent lease was void or voidable, and the extent of the trustee's power to dispose of the trust property.

Ratio Decidendi: The court held that a lease of trust property which exceeds the trustee's powers is not void but only voidable. It emphasized the necessity for the trustee to justify such alienation by unavoidable necessity, and compared the trustee's power to that of a guardian of an infant as regards the management and control of immovable property.

Final Decision: The court allowed the appeal and remanded the suit to the Court of first instance for trial upon the other issues in the case.

JUDGMENT

Spencer, J.

1. This is a suit brought by the assignee of a permanent lease granted by the trustee of a trust called Lala Dharmam to recover possession of the suit site from the tenant in occupation. The suit was dismissed in the District Munsiffs Court on the ground that the trustee had no power to alienate the trust property and that his alienation was void and conveyed no title to the plaintiff; and on appeal the District Judge has confirmed this decision and dismissed the appeal.

2. It is contended before us that a grant of a permanent lease represented not a void but a voidable transaction and that it has not yet been avoided. In Venkataramana Ayyangar v. Kasturiranga Ayyangar (1916) I.L.R. 40 M. 212 my learned brother stated: "It is now settled law that, ordinarily, a permanent alienation of trust properties is ultra vires of the powers of a trustee" and the respondents pleader asks us to treat this expression "ultra vires" as meaning void; but it does not necessarily have that signification. There is also an expression by Abdur Rahim, O.C.J., in the Full Bench opinion in the same case that the alienation of the right of making collections for the temple "was void and did not bind the temple in any way." When the learned Judge used the word "void" in this context he was not using it as opposed to voidable, as no argument was before him on the point of voidability.

3. In Palaniappa Chetty v. Sreemath Devasikamony Pandara Sannadhi (1916) I.L.R. 40 Mad. 709 the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council observed " the grant of a lease in perpetuity of debutter lands at a fixed rent required to be justified by unavoidable necessity." Such an expression would not have been used if the lease was itself a void transaction. Their Lordships compared the position of a shebait or trustee with that of a guardian of an infant as regards the management and control of immoveable property. It is well settled that if a guardian exceeds his powers in dealing with the property of an infant his acts are voidable and not void. In Abhiram Goswami v. Shyama Charan Nandi (1909) I.L.R. 36 Cal. 1003 the Privy Council were dealing with a Mokurari pattah which corresponds to a lease in perpetuity, and they held that such a lease of de-butter property given by a Mohant was good for the life-time of the Mohant who granted it. It would have been impossible for them to come to this conclusion if the grant had been void ab initio. In Kadir Ibrahim Rowthen v. Arunachellam Chettiar (1909) I.L.R. 33 Mad. 397 : 19 M.L.J. 737 it was held that a lease by a trustee for a period exceeding 21 years was not void but only voidable at the instance of the cestui que trust. This was no doubt a decision based upon Section 36 of the Indian Trusts Act (Act II of 1882) which applies only to private trusts. But in this respect the principle appears to be the same, namely, that a lease of trust property which is in excess of the trustees powers is not void but only voidable. I am therefore of opinion that the Lower Courts were wrong in deciding the case upon this point, and the appeal must be allowed and the suit remanded to the Court of first instance for trial upon the other issues in the case. Costs will abide and follow the result.

Seshagiri Aiyar, J.

4. I agree The position of the defendant must be regarded as that of a trespasser. His title has not been gone into and therefore it must be taken that he resisted the suit on the ground that the plaintiff must show a better title than he possessed.

5. The position taken by the lower Courts and which was pressed upon us by the learned Vakil for the respondent, amounts to saying that the alienation by a trustee is void ab initio like an alienation which is opposed to public policy or one made illegally. This position to my mind is untenable. As my learned brother has just now pointed out, the Judicial Committee have held that a trustee has in certain circumstances power to dispose of the trust property; he can sell it and he

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