The central legal point established is that the possession of service inam, reversionary rights, and alienation are subject to the provisions of the Limitation Act, and the property rights are determined based on the actual enjoyment and acquisition, not solely by virtue of the office.

Abdur Rahim, J.

1. The facts on which this appeal depends are to be found in para 12 of the judgment of the Lower Court. A woman called Seshamma was in possession of items 1, 2, 4, 8 and 9 for about 30 years prior to 1893 and then she alienated the properties to some third persons. The plaintiffs father setup his right as reversioner in respect of these properties and disputed the alienations. In settlement of that dispute, the alienees executed a deed of settlement in 1900 and that deed expressly recites that the claim was made by the plaintiffs father by virtue of his reversionary right. The Subordinate Judge has found that these lands were originally attached to the karnams office as service inam; but upon the facts which he has stated he came to the conclusion that the lands became disannexed from the office and that therefore the plaintiffs father acquired an absolute right to them subject only to any right of resumption which the Government may have.

2. The argument of Mr. Krishnaswami Ayyar in the first place is that these lands must be regarded as emoluments of the office of karnam that they could never cease to be as such and that the rules of limitation have no application. In support of this proposition he relies upon a ruling of the Privy Council in Jalandhar Thakar v. Jharula Das (1914) I.L.R. 42 Cal. 244. There the dispute related to the office of Shebait and his right to receive the surplus offerings. Their Lordships held that the offerings could not be disannexed from the office and that Article 144 of the Limitation Act upon the facts found did not apply. There was no question there of the right of acquisition of any immoveable property by persons holding that property for more than 12 years and it is difficult to see any analogy between the facts of that case and those of the present. Mr. Krishnaswami Aiyar also relied on a sentence in the judgment in Chandrakantam v. Subbarayudu (1914) I.L.W. 827 at 830. But there my learned brother found that the possession of the defendant was permissive and stated that even if the possession of the defendant was adverse it would not make any difference. The facts, so far as it can be gathered, were that the defendants claimed to be in joint possession of certain land along with persons holding an office in connection with a temple. There is nothing in that judgment to support the proposition put forward on behalf of the appellants. Similarly the facts of the case in Kamalathammal v. Krishna Pillai (1910) 20 L.L.J. 781 are altogether different from the facts of the present case and I cannot see that there any claim was set up to the land on the ground of prescription or adverse possession.

3. On the other hand the ruling in Neelachalam v. Kamaraju (1904) 14 M.L.J. 438 following Gnana Sambanda Pandara Sannathi v. Velu Pandaram (1899) I.L.R. 23 Mad. 271 : 10 M.L.J. 29. a decision of the Privy Council makes it perfectly clear that Article 144 and Section 28 of the Limitation Act applies to such a case as this. An earlier decision of this Court in Papayya v. Ramana (1883) I.L.R. 7 M. 85 is also to the same effect.

4. It was next argued by Mr. Krishnaswami Aiyar that the Government has a right to treat the land as service inam and that they did in fact so treat it as they afterwards enfranchised the inam by imposing quit rent. We are not concerned in this case with the right of the Government either to enfranchise the land or to impose quit rent. We are dealing in this case with the rights of the parties inter se and as between them it would seem to be impossible to hold that, upon the facts as they happened, the property had not become the absolute property of the plaintiffs.

5. For a large number of years, the properly had been enjoyed by persons, who never claimed the office of karnam so far as it appears from the evidence, as ordinarily private property and the plaintiffs acquired the property from such persons under an alienation. The plaintiffs or their father did not