The main legal point established in the judgment is the limited and qualified power of a de facto guardian to alienate property under Hindu law, emphasizing that such alienations should be for necessity or for the benefit of the estate.

Kumaraswami Sastri, J.

1. Appeal No. 213 arises out of a suit filed by the plaintiffs who are brothers and sons of one Arunachalam Pillai to set aside the sales and mortgages referred to in the plaint effected by one N.S. Ramaswamy Pillai, now deceased who, it is alleged, purported to act as their guardian though he had no right to do so and made the alienations complained of. The defendants in that suit were the alienees. Appeal No. 214 arises out of a suit filed by a mortgagee from the aforesaid guardian who seeks to enforce his mortgage on the ground that the mortgage is binding on the plaintiffs. The title of the plaintiffs father to the properties alienated by the guardian is not disputed: Though the suits were not between the same parties the evidence recorded in one suit was by consent of parties treated as evidence in the other and one judgment was delivered in both the suits. The Subordinate Judge held that the mortgage was for necessary purposes and binding and as regards the sales he hold that the sales of the properties in Schedules E, F and G were not binding on the plaintiffs, but that the other alienations were binding. The defendants concerned in the properties decreed to plaintiffs have filed no appeal and we need not consider them further. Ho held that three of the sales were good as they wore for purposes binding on the plaintiffs, and against this decree the plaintiffs in O.S. No. 43 of 1919, who are defendants in O.S. No. 19 of 1919, appeal.

2. The properties in dispute in O.S. No. 48 (appeal No. 213) are the properties comprised in Schedules A, B and C, which were purchased by the defendant 1, the property comprised in Schedule D in which defendant 9 is now interested and the property comprised in Schedule H, in which defendants 19 and 20 are interested. The plaintiffs alleged that Ramaswamy Pillai purported to act as their guardian under a will alleged to have been executed by their father, that the will is not genuine and that even, if genuine, it would not affect the properties concerned as the properties were joint ancestral properties. The father of the plaintiffs in O.S. No. 48 died on the 30th January 1906. The will which is alleged to have been executed and which the defendants set up as genuine, is dated 29th January 1906, the day before the testator died. The second wife of the deceased, who is the stepmother of plaintiff 1 and the mother of the plaintiff 2 presented the will for registration and it was registered by the Sub-Registrar. The will after referring to the illness of the testator Arunachalam Pillai and to the fact that he has a minor son Ramaswami Pillai and a daughter Meenakshi, and that the second wife was in the family way proceeds as follows I have nominated Ramasami Pillai Avl, son of Swaminatha Pillai of Nagampadi, Mayavaram taluk, as guardian to protect my family until the said minor Ramasami Pillai attains his ago of majority. He himself should have entire management of the immovable and moveable properties belonging to me, recover the debts due to the family, discharge the debts due by me by selling away the lands if necessary and carry out whatever is required to be done in the family, For performing the marriages of my minor sons and daughters ho should spend only as much as is consistent with the means and circumstances of the family and have the marriages performed.

3. It then proceeds to provide for his second wife and his mother and states that, if his junior wife begets a son, all the immovable and moveable properties of the family should be divided equally. Plaintiff 2 is the posthumous son of the testator. The Subordinate Judge found the will to be genuine and so far as the genuineness of the will is concerned I see no reason to differ from the Subordinate Judge. It is unnecessary to pursue this matter in detail as it was conceded both in the lower Court and before us that as the properties are admittedly ancestral properties, the decision of the Full Bench of t