The judgment emphasized the limitations on the power of the court to grant review as per Rule 1, Order 47, and highlighted that the mere omission of a judge to consider a decision, however regrettable or wrong, cannot be regarded as constituting an error apparent on the face of the record.

Srinivasa Aiyangar, J.

1. The defendant in the action from which the second appeal has arisen has now taken the point that the judgment of the Court appealed against was one made on an application for review to the lower appellate Court. The plaintiff whose suit had been dismissed by the trial Court appealed to the lower appellate Court. In the first place his appeal was also dismissed. He thereupon applied to the lower appellate Court for review and the review was granted and in the place of the dismissal of the appeal a decree was made in favour of the plaintiff for possession of the property sued for. This is what the learned Subordinate Judge says with regard to the ground on which he granted the review The only ground urged for review was that the Court failed to note the decision in Subba Goundan v. Krishnamachari A. I. R. 1922 Mad. 112 quoted by the appellants vakil, and wrongly noted the contention of the appellants in para. 5 of its judgment. After hearing both parties I have come to the conclusion that the appellants contentions are correct. The appellants no doubt urged the contention mentioned in para 5 of this Courts judgment in the lower Court. In appeal they seem to have given up that contention and relied on the decision reported in Subba Goundan v. Krishnamachari A. I. R. 1922 Mad. 112 The decision helps the case of the appellants, and if it is followed the judgment of this Court cannot stand. I am of opinion that there are sufficient grounds for allowing review of the judgment, and I accordingly set aside the decree.

2. As pointed out by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in the case of Chhajju Ram v. Neki A. I. R. 1922 P. C. 112 the power of the Court to grant review is circumscribed and limited by Rule 1, Order 47. It is there pointed out that it is only when new material is overlooked by excusable misfortune, mistake or error apparent on the face of the record that a review can generally be granted and that the expression "other sufficient reason" following in the rule must be construed ejusdem generis and that the sufficiency required must be of a kind analogous to the two matters already specified in the rule. There is no question in this case of any new evidence.

3. Then the question is whether the mere fact that the learned Judge in the Court of appeal failed to take into consideration a decision of this Court cited to him at the Bar could be regarded, as he seems to have thought, as a proper and sufficient ground for granting the review. My attention has been drawn by the learned counsel for the respondent to two judgments, one of which is of this Court, viz., Murari Rao v. Balavanath Dikshit A. I. R. 1924 Mad. 98 In that case the view was taken by the learned Judges that an error made by a Court in considering that the sisters sons of a deceased Hindu governed by Mitakshara law were preferential heirs to the nearest agnates was an error apparent on the face of the record. It is possible to doubt the correctness of that decision because though it may be regarded as an error appearing on the record still I fail to see how such an error can be regarded as an error apparent on the face of the record. In a statutory enactment every word used must receive its full and proper connotation in the construction. I doubt very much whether even such an error as the one that was under consideration in that case can properly be regarded as an error apparent on the face of the record. But the learned Judges have said so and it is not necessary for me for the purpose of this second appeal to discuss that further, because it may be possible to regard such an elementary and clear rule of succession in Hindu law as so well established that the error may even be described as an error apparent on the face of the record. But it cannot possibly be said that the error of law in this case can be regardad at all in the same light as the error which was the subject of consideration in that case or on the same level